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LIFECYCLES OF COMPETITION
SYSTEMS: EXPLAINING VARIATION IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW
REGIMES
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I
INTRODUCTION
The emergence of competition law as a global enterprise is a remarkable
development in economic regulation.1 For nearly a century after the adoption of
the first national statutes in the late nineteenth century,2 competition law, or
antitrust, was largely an American idiosyncrasy.3 This is no longer the case. Since
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1. See Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: Explaining
Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at
2 (describing development of competition law and challenges faced by competition agencies). In this
article, “competition law” encompasses the policy tools (including law enforcement, advocacy, research,
market studies, and business education) that countries use to proscribe anti-competitive business
practices and to promote the adoption of pro-competitive public policies. See William E. Kovacic,
Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The Case of Competition
Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 281–86 (2001) [hereinafter Institutional
Foundations] (describing policy tools that comprise competition law and policy).
2. See D. Jeffrey Brown, Introduction to Competition Law, in COMPETITION ACT &
COMMENTARY 1, 6–13 (Stikeman Elliott LLP ed., 2015) (describing passage of Canada’s competition
law in 1889).
3. The United States enacted its first federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act, in 1890. Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (1982). The adoption of the statute is examined in MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916, at 93–117 (1988). A small number of other
jurisdictions established competition law systems in the century after the Sherman Act was passed.
Notable additions took place in 1958 when Germany’s competition law took effect and the European
Community, through the Treaty of Rome, adopted the competition articles that created the European
Union’s competition law system. On the enactment of Germany’s competition law, see Gerard
Braunthal, The Struggle for Cartel Legislation, in CASES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 187, 191–200
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the late 1980s, the number of jurisdictions with competition laws has soared from
roughly thirty to more than 130,4 and more are on the way.5 Many modern
adopters are countries that once seemed immutably committed to central
planning and government ownership as the foundations for economic progress
until the recent past.6
The astonishing global expansion of competition law has considerable
economic significance beyond the well-established regimes in the European
Union and the United States, which together had, until recently, functioned as a
form of regulatory duopoly in international competition law since the early
1990s.7 For large multinational companies, the establishment of new systems in
Brazil and China and the makeover of India’s older, ineffective competition
regime have transformed the planning of mergers and required reconsideration
of practices such as the licensing of intellectual property.8 Though its AntiMonopoly Law only took effect in August 2008,9 China already is a peer of the
European Union and the United States in its capacity to shape global norms of

(James B. Chirstoph & Bernard E. Brown eds., 1965). The adoption of the competition articles of the
Treaty of Rome is recounted in DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUIS 342–45 (Oxford University Press, paperback ed. 2001).
4. See William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its Future Influence on Global Competition Policy,
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1157, 1157–58 & n.7 (2015) [hereinafter Influence] (describing global creation
of competition law systems). The calculation of how many countries have competition law systems is an
imprecise exercise. For a discussion of classification questions and other methodological issues, see Mark
R.A. Palim, The worldwide growth of competition law: an empirical analysis, 43 ANTITRUST BULL.,
Spring 1998, at 105 [hereinafter Palim, Worldwide Growth].
5. For example, Nigeria is moving toward enacting a competition law. Mark Briggs, Nigeria edges
closer to competition law, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (June 9, 2016), http://globalcompetition
review.com/news/article/41227/nigeria-edges-closer-competition-law/ [https:// perma.cc/8STQ-B8W5].
6. The adoption of competition laws in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
South Africa) is illustrative. Thirty years ago, these nations seemed unlikely to pursue market-based
reforms and create competition systems. See generally COMPETITION LAW IN THE BRICS COUNTRIES
(Adrian Emch et al. eds., 2012) (detailing establishment of competition law in BRICS nations); see also
COMPETITION LAW AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE BRICS AND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Frederic
Jenny & Yannis Katsoulacos eds., 2016) [hereinafter COMPETITION LAW AND ENFORCEMENT]
(discussing development of competition law in BRICS nations and other developing countries). The
adopters since 1990 are not only planned economies or developing countries. These include Austria,
Italy, and the Netherlands. See NMa, Annual Report 1998, at 3 (1998), available at
www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/11598/NMa-1998-Annual-0Report/
[https://perma.cc/T775L98Y] (noting adoption by the Netherlands of its first competition law in 1998); www.agcm.it/en/
[https://perma.cc/TD2A-WSWH] (describing enactment of Italy’s first competition law in 1990).
7. See William E. Kovacic, Dominance, Duopoly and Oligopoly: The United States and the
Development of Global Competition Policy, 14 GLOB. COMPETITION REV. 39, 39 (2010) (recounting the
development of the EU/U.S. competition law duopoly).
8. See Kovacic, Influence, supra note 4, at 1158 (discussing the expansion in the number of the
world’s competition systems and its significance for business decision making).
9. Xiaoye Wang & Adrian Emch, Chinese Antitrust—a Snapshot, J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 12, 12–13
& n.1 (Supp. Oct. 2015) (describing adoption and implementation of China’s Anti-monopoly Law).
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business behavior.10 In the years to come, regional alliances such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations may achieve the same stature.11
For students of regulation, the establishment of new competition law systems
commands attention for another reason. The creation of so many new systems—
roughly 100 new regimes in barely twenty-five years12—provides an unmatched
opportunity to study why regulatory institutions come into being, how they
evolve, and what makes them succeed or fail in carrying out their legal mandates.
Our unscientific impression is that there is no other field of economic policy in
which so many jurisdictions adopted a new regulatory regime for the first time in
so short a period.13 Competition law now encompasses an extraordinary array of
10. See generally CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS (Adrian Emch & David
Stallibras eds., 2013) (discussing how China’s Anti-monopoly Law has already shaped global business);
see also Symposium, Competition Law in China Today, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 1 (Supp. Oct. 2015)
(discussing development of China’s competition law system); Yane Svetiev & Lei Wang, Competition
Law Enforcement in China: Between Technocracy and Industrial Policy, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 4, 2016, at 190.
11. The Association of South East Asian Nation committed its members to adopt competition laws
by the end of 2015. The association’s competition law treaty commitments appear at www.asean.org. This
spurred the creation of new systems in Myanmar and the Philippines. The association recently launched
the Competition Policy and Law Program to encourage cooperation and policy integration in
competition law across the region. Calvin Hui, Singapore’s Competition Commission leads effort to align
competition policy and law in ASEAN (Apr. 27, 2016), available at http://www.channelnewsasia.
com/news/business/singapore/singapore-s-competition/2735476.html.
12. See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 2 (describing diffusion of competition systems globally).
We derive our estimate from several sources. We began with Mark Palim’s study in 1998, which identified
jurisdictions with competition laws as of 1990. See Palim, Worldwide Growth, supra note 4, at 106–09 &
n.15. We then identified adopters since 1990 with the George Washington University Law School’s
Competition Law Center data base and the membership data for the International Competition Network.
See Worldwide Competition Database, THE GEO. WASH. COMPETITION L. CTR., http://www.gwclc.
com/World-competition-database.html [https://perma.cc/D3WP-9KEK] (compiling data on institutional
characteristics of competition law systems); Members Directory, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK,
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/member-directory.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z5YXK7VV].
13. In the late 1980s and in the 1990s, many communist or socialist countries undertook marketoriented economic reforms. The economic reform process in these countries is documented in THE
EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Christopher Clague & Gordon C
Raussner eds., 1992) [hereinafter EMERGENCE] (describing economic reforms undertaken by transition
economies after fall of Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Soviet Union). These changes reflected the
realization that a successful transition to a market system required basic changes in the existing legal
framework. See Mancur Olson, The Hidden Path to a Successful Economy, in EMERGENCE, supra, at 55,
65 (“To realize all the gains from trade, . . . there has to be a legal system and political order that enforces
contracts, protects property rights, carries out mortgage agreements, provides for limited liability
corporations, and facilitates a lasting and widely used capital market that makes the investments and
loans more liquid than they would otherwise be.”). Amid all economic law reform activity in this period,
the breadth of adoption of competition laws seems unmatched. We tested our impression by examining
the proceedings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, whose programs
support reforms to spur economic growth. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD 50TH
ANNIVERSARY VISION STATEMENT 2 (2011) (“Throughout its history, the OECD . . . has assisted
countries in fostering good governance and reforming and improving their economic policies to generate
greater economic growth.”). The OECD operates through a framework of about 250 committees, expert
groups, and working groups. See Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, The International Competition
Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 274, 289 (2011) (describing operations
of OECD). Our review of their work reveals no other area of economic regulation in which so many
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jurisdictions in most parts of the world.14 Since 1990, the extensive
experimentation with institutional design and policy implementation for
competition law has elicited attention from scholars in economics, history, law,
political science, and public administration.15
This article examines one aspect of the global adoption of competition law
systems: what jurisdictions must do to build the institutions needed for effective
competition law implementation, and in particular, to develop programs that
improve economic performance.16 Rather than assess whether recently-created
competition systems have reduced prices, improved product quality, or
stimulated innovation,17 this article analyzes how well various jurisdictions have
created the institutional predicates for achieving these aims.
This article discusses the topic of institutions and implementation as follows.
Part II sets out the major assumptions that have guided our study of competition
system lifecycles.18 It discusses the importance of institutional design and policy
implementation capacity, and, focusing on institutional considerations, provides
our own definition of what constitutes a “good” competition regime.
Part III considers the specific obstacles that a jurisdiction must surmount to
establish an effective competition law regime. In doing so, it emphasizes that the
establishment of a well-functioning system in most jurisdictions is likely to be a
relatively slow process. It suggests that it takes roughly twenty to twenty-five
years from the adoption of a law to determine whether a new competition law
regime is on the path to successful implementation over the longer term. In more
jurisdictions have created new legal regimes in numbers comparable to competition law.
14. See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 2 (describing the expansion of competition law systems).
The broad geographic distribution of competition systems is evident from the membership of the
International Competition Network. See Member Directory, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
NETWORK, www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/membersdirectory.aspx (listing, by
continent, International Competition Network members).
15. The multidisciplinary study of new competition systems is evident in the contributions to this
issue of Law & Contemporary Problems. See, e.g., Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1 (collaboration between
two political scientists to analyze the development of new competition systems); A.E. Rodriguez &
Ashok Menon, The Causes of Competition Agency Ineffectiveness in Developing Countries, 79 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 37 (study by economists of limits on ability of competition agencies to
implement policy successfully).
16. Commentators identify improved economic performance (for example, greater productivity and
increased innovation) as an important competition policy goal, but also suggest that competition law can
help realize other aims, such as the reduction of corruption and poverty. See Competition law and Policy:
drivers of economic growth and development, 4 COHERENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT 1 (Org. for Econ.
Cooperation & Dev., Jan. 2015) (discussing competition law’s capacity to increase productivity and
innovation, while also fighting corruption and reducing poverty). In focusing on improvements in
economic performance, we are aware that nations adopt competition laws to achieve other policy goals.
See Barak Orbach, The Goals of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2151 (2013) (discussing varied
objectives of competition systems). We know of no jurisdiction that, in enacting and implementing a
competition law, has been indifferent to the purpose of improving economic performance.
17. A growing literature has sought to assess the economic impact of competition law enforcement
decisions. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., REFERENCE GUIDE ON EX-POST EVALUATION
OF COMPETITION AGENCIES’ DECISIONS (Apr. 2016) (presenting framework for ex post evaluation and
reviewing studies of effects of competition agency decisions).
18. See infra Part II.
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difficult circumstances, the path can be longer. This calls for realism in setting
expectations about what a competition system can do, and how quickly it can do
it.
Though the more than 100 competition systems formed since the late 1980s
have evolved in different ways, some general patterns have emerged. Part IV
presents the principal evolutionary paths that new competition systems have
taken. We call these paths “lifecycles” to convey the notion that there are
recurring patterns in how competition systems evolve. By studying system
lifecycles, jurisdictions can improve the performance of existing competition
regimes and can better anticipate and contend with obstacles to creating effective
new systems. The path most closely associated with implementation success is a
gradual upward sloping curve of progress—a condition that underscores the
importance of sustained, incremental improvements to institutions entrusted
with key implementation tasks.
Part V presents factors that determine the rate at which new systems gain
implementation proficiency. Key considerations include resources (financial
outlays and human capital), agency leadership, political commitment and
stability, and the quality of supporting institutions, such as courts and
universities.19
Part VI offers some conclusions about the path of implementation success.
Given a choice between consumption in the form of starting new cases or other
programs and investment in institution-building, new systems are well advised to
emphasize investment when allocating resources in the first decades of their
development.
II
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND GOOD AGENCY PERFORMANCE
This article’s basic premise is that improvements in institutional
arrangements tend to yield superior policy outcomes. For much of the 1990s, the
national and multinational donor organizations that fostered adoption of
competition laws generally gave inadequate attention to institutional design and
policy implementation.20 Organizations that advised nations in the formulation
of new laws slighted the institutional arrangements that are vital to the successful
implementation of new competition laws.21 Donors often measured their own
success by the number of new laws adopted, without regard to the effectiveness
or sustainability of the laws they helped implement.22 At the same time, the

19. See infra Part V.
20. See William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in
Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 403, 404 (1997) [hereinafter Getting Started] (describing
weak attention given to implementation concerns in the 1990s).
21. See William E. Kovacic, Lucky Trip? Perspectives from a Foreign Advisor on Competition
Policy, Development and Technical Assistance, 3 EUROPEAN COMP. J. 319 (2007) [hereinafter Lucky
Trip].
22. Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 404.
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competition law agendas of international organizations such as the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development were rich in discussions regarding
what substantive competition programs systems should pursue but lean in
treatment of how to effectuate them.23
To a striking degree, policy implementation issues were seen as mere
technical details to be sorted out once the competition law had been passed.24 In
drafting new competition statutes, external advisors often provided off-the-rack
solutions from other jurisdictions with little tailoring to account for local
conditions or implementation capabilities.25 The prevailing wisdom also pressed
toward adopting fully-loaded competition regimes that included the complete set
of policy commands that were the norm in older systems such as the European
Union and the United States.26 This development partly reflected the view that
transition economies would have a single political opportunity to make basic
economic reforms.27 If one assumed that the political will to enact reforms would
evaporate, it became necessary to pack everything into the competition law from
the outset. The possibility for future upgrades or gradual, phased implementation
was seen as remote.28
A. The Ascent Of Implementation Concerns
Academic scholarship and government policymaking over the past fifteen
years reveal a growing recognition that implementation issues demand close
attention from day one of a law reform process.29 Statutes with grand policy
aspirations but weak means for implementation can pointlessly consume
resources from both public officials and business operators.30 Worse, they can
engender cynicism about lawmaking and public administration generally in the
eyes of citizens who too often have seen their governments promise too much
and deliver too little.31 But implementation is increasingly getting the attention it
deserves from academics, government officials, and practitioners. With greater
23. The agenda of Policy Roundtables convened by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development displays this tendency. Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Competition Committee,
Policy Roundtables, www.oecd.org/competition/roundtables.htm [https://perma.cc/E26R-KZ8A]. Until
the mid-2000s, the topics of these roundtables dealt predominantly with issues of substantive antitrust
analysis. From the mid-2000s onward, one sees a larger number of sessions that address policy
implementation concerns.
24. See Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 404.
25. See generally Kovacic, Lucky Trip, supra note 21 (examining this tendency across several
countries). On the dangers of this approach for law reform, see Jean-Jacques Laffont, Competition,
Information, and Development, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT 1998 237
(Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 1999).
26. See Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 407.
27. See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 274–75.
28. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 274–75, 298–301.
29. THE DESIGN OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS: GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL CHOICES
(Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci,
Designing Competition Law Institutions, 25 WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 361 (2002).
30. See Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 404.
31. Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 404.
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frequency and intensity, discussions about competition law today address how to
establish the institutional foundations necessary to achieve good policy results32
as well as how to measure the effectiveness of different institutional
configurations.33
This article’s focus on lifecycles emphasizes the history of policy
implementation across jurisdictions. Building a new regulatory system involves
considerable experimentation with substantive policy approaches and
implementation techniques.34 The capacity to learn from one’s own experience
and from the collective experience of other institutions with similar
responsibilities separates superior institutions from weaker regimes.35 This
historical perspective guides the initial design and early operation of a regulatory
system and, more importantly, informs the pursuit of refinements that improve
performance over time.36 Agencies that embrace a virtuous cycle of
experimentation, assessment, and refinement greatly boost their prospects for
success.37
32. See, e.g., DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
xi (2011) (“Institutions . . . are a critical and underappreciated driver of an antitrust policy that interacts
in many subtle ways with substantive antitrust rules and decisions.”); ANNETJE OTTOW, MARKET AND
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES: GOOD AGENCY PRINCIPLES (2015) (discussing generally how
competition systems operate and their structural principles).
33. See generally David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agency Design: What’s on
the Menu?, 8 EUR. COMPETITION J. 527, 528–36 (2012) (assessing a variety of different competition
agency design systems and how choices can affect future effectiveness of these systems).
34. See generally William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments
of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 843 (2001)
(modeling antitrust enforcement as an experimental process and urging use of ex-post evaluation to
assess outcomes of enforcement experiments). This is evident, for example, in the experience of the
United States. The decision to create a second federal enforcement institution in 1914 (the Federal Trade
Commission) can be seen as an experiment with administrative policy development as an alternative to
enforcement of the antitrust laws by the Department of Justice in the federal courts. See Marc Winerman,
The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 62–
88, 90–92 (2003) (discussing legislative rationale for creation of FTC). The evolution of the Justice
Department’s criminal enforcement program against cartels likewise has exhibited considerable
experimentation and adjustment, especially since the mid-1970s. See William E. Kovacic, Criminal
Enforcement Norms in Competition Policy: Insights from US Experience, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS
45 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).
35. See Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Outpost Years for a Start-Up Agency: The FTC from
1921 to 1925, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 145, 146–49 (2010) (describing value of historical study as way to
understand the FTC and to identify challenges other agencies will face in the early period of their
development); William E. Kovacic, The FTC at 100: Into Our Second Century 2-5 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter
FTC at 100], http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-100-oursecond-century/ftc100rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/JUE2-BJKZ] (discussing benefits to FTC of
benchmarking itself with other competition agencies).
36. See generally Edward J. Balleisen & Elizabeth K. Brake, Historical Perspective and Better
Regulatory Governance: An Agenda for Institutional Reform, 8 REG. & GOV. 222 (2014) (highlighting
different ways in which regulatory agencies use history to make future policy choices and evaluating
historical perspectives in shaping regulatory policy).
37. See William E. Kovacic, Achieving better practices in the design of competition policy institutions,
50 ANTITRUST BULL. 511, 511–13 (Fall 2005) (making the case for a process of policy innovation that
involves experimentation with new techniques, the identification of superior approaches through regular
evaluation, and the adoption of better practices); William E. Kovacic, Politics and Partisanship in U.S.
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B. Note On Methodology
There is a large and growing body of literature on the development of new
competition law systems.38 This reflects the exceptional number of research paths
opened by the remarkable expansion of competition law as a global concern. This
article builds upon this literature and draws upon three additional resources. One
such resource is a benchmarking project undertaken by the George Washington
University Law School’s Competition Law Center. This project has collected
information about ten major institutional characteristics for the world’s 130
competition law systems.39 The process of preparing this study has provided a
valuable opportunity to use the information to see how individual systems have
evolved.
A second information source consists of reports and peer reviews prepared
by the International Competition Network, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development on matters related to competition law implementation.40 One
of this article’s authors has written three of these reviews and is now engaged in
a project to study the implementation of earlier recommendations in Ukraine.41
The third source consists of interviews. The authors have spoken with current
and former competition agency officials, practitioners, and academics, and have
conducted site visits in various countries.42 These activities yield information that
can be illuminating or untrustworthy—sometimes at the same time. There are
many difficulties associated with relying on interviews to assess the quality of
competition agencies or to form conclusions about how they evolved.43 Current
Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 708 (2014) [hereinafter Partisanship] (describing
three step process of experimentation, assessment, and refinement).
38. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text (describing how establishment of new systems
creates new opportunities for scholarly study).
39. World Competition Database, supra note 12.
40. The OECD’s peer reviews are collected at www.oecd.org [https://perma.cc/YJJ2-4SSM]. The
UNCTAD peer reviews appear at www.unctad.org [https://perma.cc/3GAF-LACB].
41. Kovacic has co-authored UNCTAD peer reviews for Armenia, Pakistan, and Ukraine.
UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Ukraine (July 5, 2013) [hereinafter
UNCTAD
Ukraine
Peer
Review],
available
at
www.unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary
/ditcclp2013d3_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E8A-WD8S]; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of
Competition Law and Policy: Pakistan (June 6, 2013), available at www.unctad.org/en/Publications
Library/ditcclp201.3d4_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK7Q-556X]; UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of
Competition Policy: Armenia (Aug. 31, 2010), available at www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20101_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E23U-3J6P]. Kovacic presently is participating in an OECD project to examine
Ukraine’s implementation of recommendations contained in the UNCTAD peer review and an earlier
OECD peer review of Ukraine’s competition law system. OECD, Peer Review of Ukraine’s
Antimonopoly System (2008), available at www.oecd.org [https://perma.cc/YJJ2-4SSM].
42. Since 2011, at least one of the authors has visited the competition authorities of the following
jurisdictions that adopted competition laws from 1990 onward: Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Barbados,
Botswana, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand,
Turkey, Ukraine, and Zambia.
43. On the hazards in relying on first-person narratives to understand the actions and motives of a
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or former agency officials sometimes portray events in a way that flatters their
contributions to public service;44 practitioners occasionally grind axes to express
unhappiness arising from an adverse result in a matter before a competition
authority;45 and academics periodically scold agencies for not embracing their
policy recommendations.46 To correct for these difficulties the authors have
sought to interview as many individuals as possible and to verify subjective
assessments by reference to observable facts.
The collection and interpretation of this information is deeply influenced by
the interdisciplinary orientation of Duke University’s Kenan Institute for Ethics’
Rethinking Regulation Initiative.47 The legal system analysis is enriched by
insights derived from several bodies of learning that the Rethinking Regulation
Initiative seeks to unite: economics, history, law, political science, and public
administration.48 For competition law or otherwise, the establishment of a
successful regulatory regime requires an awareness of the economic and political
conditions that facilitate or hinder policy implementation, an understanding of
the incentive structures that motivate agency leadership and staff, and reflection
upon perspectives derived from actual experience.49 Simply drafting legal
commands and procedural mechanisms without these pillars begs failure.50
competition agency, see William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Stories, 4 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 241 (2008)
(reviewing ANTITRUST STORIES (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007)).
44. See Kovacic, Partisanship, supra note 37, at 697–98 (describing how current and former antitrust
officials sometimes depict events in a manner that magnifies their accomplishments).
45. In our experience competition law practitioners tend either to criticize competition agencies for
not being active enough, or, when the agency is active and moves against one of their clients, for reaching
an infringement decision.
46. Kovacic spent fifteen years in academia before returning to the Federal Trade Commission to
serve in senior management positions. The experience drove home how poorly academics understand
the size of the gap between the theory of public policy and its practice.
47. See Rethinking Regulation, THE KENAN INSTITUTE FOR ETHICS AT DUKE UNIVERSITY,
www.kenan.ethics.duke.edu/regulation/about/rethinking-regulation [https://perma.cc/E6J9-3XHV] (last
visited May 29, 2016) (outlining the Rethinking Regulation Initiative and its goals).
48. Id. See also David Deller & Francesca Vantaggiato, Revisiting the Regulatory State: A
Multidisciplinary Review Establishing a New Research Agenda (Centre for Competition Policy,
University of East Anglia, 2014) (discussing value of multidisciplinary perspective in analyzing regulatory
agency design and performance).
49. On the importance of a careful examination of existing economic and political conditions and
institutional arrangements as a foundation for regulatory reform, see William E. Kovacic, Designing and
Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives
from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1215–23 (1995) [hereinafter
Perspectives]. See also MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 4
(2003) (discussing special considerations in devising competition policy in small markets; observing that
“Small economies need a competition policy that is specifically tailored to their markets.”); Oliver
Budzinski & Maryam H.A. Beigi, Generating Instead of Protecting Competition, in THE ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF DEVELOPING JURISDICTIONS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW 224,
229 (Michal S. Gal et al., eds., 2015) (“Competition policy is not an isolated concept; it needs to be
effective with respect to the context of the society where it is implemented”).
50. The habit of Western advisors of giving transition economies off-the-rack regulatory solutions
devised in well-established market economies, and to slight implementation issues, is criticized in William
E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist
Countries, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 437, 437–39, 445–51 (1996) [hereinafter Entrepreneur].
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III
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: TASKS, CHALLENGES, AND REALISTIC
EXPECTATIONS
Evaluating competition law regimes raises a dual inquiry: not only how but
also when to determine whether a new competition law system is working
effectively. The first part of the question requires at least a preliminary inquiry
into what constitutes good performance by a regulatory agency and, ideally, how
much an agency has contributed to improvements in economic performance.
Because performance is difficult to measure, elected officials, journalists,
practitioners, regulators, and academic researchers often use activity-related
proxies.51 Perhaps the most common performance metric used in popular and
scholarly discussions of regulatory agency behavior, and certainly the behavior
of competition agencies, is the amount of activity in the form of investigations
launched, cases prosecuted, fines imposed, and rules promulgated.52 Many
competition agency officials begin speeches by saying that their organizations
have been “busy,” a statement based on the premise that high levels of activity
certify quality in an agency.53
Yet activity levels are dreadfully ambiguous indicators of agency
performance.54 To be sure, activity is hardly irrelevant to a sound assessment of
51. On the popularity of activity-based measures of competition agency performance, see William
E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies Signal Quality, 22 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 237, 246–47 (2015) [hereinafter Respected Brand]; William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition
Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 908 (2009) [hereinafter
Rating the Competition Agencies]; William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 404–05 (2003) [hereinafter Enforcement Norms]. There is
a healthy and growing effort, by agencies and scholars, to develop and apply techniques for answering
the fundamental question of economic impact. This is evident, among other places, in the programs of
the OECD’s Competition Committee, which has held several roundtables on the evaluation of
competition agency effectiveness. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Rating Enforcement 2015: The Annual Ranking of the World’s Top Antitrust
Authorities, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. 1, 2–32 (2015) (presenting evaluation criteria, which gives the
heaviest weight to activity levels, including cases prosecuted); James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic,
Behavioral Economics and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 779,
783–84 (2012) (describing forces that create pressure for regulators to maximize “observable action”);
William E. Kovacic et al., How Does Your Competition Agency Measure Up?, 7 EUR. COMPETITION L.J.
25, 27–30, 37–39 (2011) [hereinafter Measure Up] (discussing popularity of activity-based measures of
competition agency effectiveness).
53. See Kovacic et al., Measure Up, supra note 52, at 27–28 (noting this tendency); see also Renata
B. Hesse, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks at the Global Competition Review Live 5th Annual Antitrust Law Leaders Forum 1 (Miami, FL.,
Feb. 5, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorneygeneral-renata-b-hesse-delivers-remarks-global (“2015 was a busy year for the division – we opened a
number of investigations, logged a lot of trial time, and recorded several victories of note”); Sharis Pozen,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Developments at the
Antitrust Division & The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines – One Year Later 1 (Washington, D.C., Nov.
17, 2011), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-sharis-pozenspeaks-american-bar-association-2011 (“[I]t has been a busy and exciting time to be at the division.”).
54. See Svetlana Ardasheva et al., Distorting effects of competition authority’s measurement: the case
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agency performance.55 An agency that does nothing to apply its powers properly
can be regarded as a failure.56 For example, at least some level of law enforcement
is necessary to deter infringements, to build and sustain agency capacity, and to
establish the institution’s legitimacy, in a broad political and social sense.57 After
all, why should legislators entrust public funds to an agency that mothballs its
powers? But a single-minded focus on activity (the output) cannot automatically
be equated with accomplishment (the outcome). Doing a lot of things is not the
same as doing the right things, or doing them the right way.
Activity-centrism also creates warped incentives for senior leaders, who may
focus on the acclaim and headlines that accompany new initiatives but ignore the
long-term costs to the agency and the public when improvidently conceived (but
flashy) matters later implode.58 Leaders who succumb to the sirens of activity also
are likely to underinvest in long-term assets, failing to develop and cultivate
knowledge, procedures, administrative infrastructure, and staff capacity that
would increase the agency’s potential for future success.59
In the first decades of a new competition agency, resources should be
allocated primarily to the enhancement of institutional foundations and agency
capability, and secondarily to the exercise of law enforcement or rulemaking
powers.60 The key institutional foundations include: processes for defining goals,
choosing a strategy to realize the agency’s objectives, selecting projects, and
testing evidence rigorously; regular investments in knowledge; the disclosure of
enforcement intentions and analytical methods; and routine evaluation.61 As
capability increases, the agency can pursue a more ambitious program.62 This
of Russia, 29 INT’L J. PUBLIC SECTOR MGMT 288 (2016) (documenting adverse incentive effects of
measuring competition agency performance by counting the number of tasks completed); Kovacic,
Rating the Competition Agencies, supra note 51, at 908 (explaining why activity levels poorly reflect
agency performance); Kovacic, Enforcement Norms, supra note 51, at 408–10; Kovacic et al., Measure
Up, supra note 52, at 37–39.
55. See Kovacic, Respected Brand, supra note 51, at 247–48 (describing importance to an agency’s
credibility of sustaining a basic level of activity).
56. See id. (describing how non-enforcement of a legal command can deny an agency “an important
measure of political and reputational capital”). At the same time, however, an antitrust agency’s
reputation may improve if it declines to enforce a legal command that has come to be widely regarded as
ill-conceived and hostile to consumer interests. See Kovacic, Enforcement Norms, supra note 51, at 410–
15 (describing retreat of Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission since early 1970s from
enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act); Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman, 83 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 2064, 2066-67 (2015).
57. See Kovacic, Respected Brand, supra note 51, at 247–48.
58. See William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Consume or Invest: What Do/Should Agency
Leaders Maximize?, 91 WASH. L. REV. 295, 317–20 (2016) [hereinafter Consume or Invest] (analyzing
this phenomenon).
59. See id. at 304–13 (discussing how excessive emphasis on launching new cases or rulemaking
proceedings can cause underinvestment in building capacity needed to carry out such measures
successfully).
60. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the need to match program commitments to institutional
capabilities, especially early on in an agency’s lifetime).
61. See Kovacic et al., Measure Up, supra note 52, at 30–33 (setting out institutional predicates for
success).
62. See id.
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article assumes that improvements in capability—notably, increases in the
agency’s human capital, the augmentation of its base of knowledge, and mastery
of the evidence-gathering methods and analytical techniques that are integral to
the development of successful cases and other policy measures—tend over time
to increase the frequency with which the agency’s work improves social welfare.
Mexico’s competition system illustrates the virtues of sustained incremental
improvement. Mexico’s competition agency is a success story, but it was not an
overnight wonder. The agency did not mount a major assault on the dominant
position of Telmex, the largest provider of telecommunications services in
Mexico, and its politically powerful leader, Carlos Slim, until well into the second
decade of its operations.63 Though the Telmex matter—which focused on conduct
alleged to be an abuse of a dominant market position—did not accomplish all of
its goals, the properly timed action catalyzed significant improvements in the
country’s telecommunications sector.64
A second issue is to determine the right time to assess effectiveness. It is
possible to form tentative views in the earliest stages of a new regime.65 For both
domestic participants and external observers, it is sensible to monitor progress of
a new system from its early days and use regular assessments as tools to improve
programs or institutional arrangements.66 Early focal points for evaluation
include success in hiring skilled professionals and administrative personnel,
building public awareness of the competition law regime, issuing guidelines
regarding the agency’s enforcement intentions, and in accelerating the processing
of routine tasks, such as the review of merger applications under a system of
mandatory notification.67 A habit of assessing the results of individual matters
and measuring progress in building an effective administrative infrastructure
facilitates learning and shows the way to improvements that strengthen the
competition system.68 This process also supplies the basis for an agency to seek
“upgrades” to its powers, structure, and resources to remedy imperfections that
become apparent in the course of operating the agency.69
63. William E. Kovacic, Interview with Eduardo Perez Motta, Former President of the CFC
(Mexico’s competition commission) in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 2016); Umut Aydin, Competition Law
and Policy in Mexico: Successes and Challenges, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016 at 170–71.
64. Interview with Eduardo Perez Motta, supra note 63. The Mexican competition authority’s
initiative appears to have helped trigger a major upgrading of the powers of Mexico’s
telecommunications regulator and motivated closer scrutiny of Telmex going forward. Id.
65. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 313–14 (describing importance of early and
continuing efforts to evaluate progress toward building effective competition law institutions).
66. Id.
67. Kovacic, Getting Started, supra note 20, at 446–52.
68. Kovacic, FTC at 100, supra note 35, at 4–6 (habit of self-assessment serves to increase capacity
and improve performance).
69. A characteristic of successful competition systems, both old and new, is that they periodically
receive enhancements in powers, structure, and resources. This has been the case for newer systems such
as South Africa, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. See Dennis Davis, The South African Competition Experience:
A Review of Fifteen Years into a New Regime, in ANTITRUST IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 159 (Eleanor M. Fox et al., eds., 2015) (reviewing experience in South Africa); Andre
Gilberto, Competition Law Enforcement in Brazil: How CADE Is Overcoming Deep Structural Problems
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One can, and should, assess progress continuously throughout the
development of the new regime. Competition officials are increasingly aware that
this type of routine assessment is a core element of good management: regular
assessment of performance facilitates the process of learning and improvement
by which institutions become more effective.70 At the same time, one should keep
in mind that it can take twenty to twenty-five years to form a reliable impression
of whether the new system truly has taken root and is able to realize sustained
implementation success. Views formed in the earliest stages of a competition
regime can be misleading.71 For most jurisdictions it takes at least this long to
construct and set the system’s institutional footings, which include adopting and
refining the initial statutory scheme, obtaining judicial interpretations of the law’s
substantive commands and procedural features, building capacity within the
competition agency, and improving the supporting institutions (such as
universities) whose contributions are necessary to sustain an effective system.72
The need to observe a new system’s development for a significant time before
drawing strong conclusions about its ruggedness and effectiveness is apparent in
the experience of Latin America’s competition systems through the mid-1990s.
Within five years of its creation, Peru’s competition agency INDECOPI73 had
gained a superior reputation within Latin America and globally, largely through
the work of Beatriz Boza, the agency’s first chair, and the exceptional
professionals she recruited to fill senior management posts.74 The launch of new
competition systems in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela was no less impressive.
Astute leaders headed each of these systems (Jorge Bogo in Argentina, Gesner
Oliveira in Brazil, and Ana Julia Jatar in Venezuela) and attracted bright, young
men and women to join them.75 The early success these systems enjoyed in

to Become an Internationally Recognized Agency, in ANTITRUST IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 11 (Eleanor M. Fox et al. eds., 2015) (analyzing Brazil); Francisco Agüero, Chilean Antitrust
Policy: Some Lessons Behind Its Success, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 152–54 (discussing
the Chilean case); Aydin, supra note 63, at 182 (discussing development of Mexico’s system).
70. On May 16, 2016, Kovacic chaired a roundtable of competition agency enforcers a conference
in Mexico City at the Competition Midyear Meeting of the International Bar Association. The panelists
included Esteban Grecco, the head of Argentina’s competition agency; Eduardo Frade, a member of the
board of CADE, Brazil’s competition authority; and Alejandra Palacios, the president of Mexico’s
competition agency. All emphasized the value of developing and applying performance metrics to assess
the quality of their internal procedures.
71. See infra notes 73–81and accompanying text.
72. See generally Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 3 (expanding on how competition
systems grow and evolve and that it is necessary to give these institutions proper time to mature before
assessing their success).
73. See generally LESSONS FROM THE FIRST YEARS OF INDECOPI: PERU’S EXPERIENCE IN
MARKET REGULATORY REFORM 1993–1998 (Beatriz Boza ed,. 1998) (discussing the formation and
early years of INDECOPI).
74. Interview with Luis Canseco-Diaz, Former Judge with Peru’s Intellectual Property Court, in
Lima, Peru (Aug. 21, 2016).
75. Kovacic observed the development of these institutions in the course of several visits to these
countries in the 1990s and in conversations with the three officials at various international events in that
decade.
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building exceptional teams of professionals and articulating a vision of policy
implementation appeared to set a foundation for even better days to come.76
Experience over the past two decades has confounded some of the elevated
expectations of the mid-1990s. Of the three jurisdictions that had ascended
quickly, only Brazil’s competition system today retains the full luster of its early
days.77 At the same time, the performance of Latin American systems that
seemed less promising in the mid-1990s has improved steadily.78 For example, the
competition law regimes in Chile and Mexico developed slowly. Beginning in the
1990s, each system gradually enhanced the quality of its professional staff,
obtained improvements in their statutory mandates, and undertook progressively
more ambitious enforcement programs.79 Chile and Mexico now stand with Brazil
as cases of largely successful policy implementation.80 Colombia’s competition
regime, begun over a half-century ago, has also made notable progress in recent
years.81
However, these examples provide no assurance that an agency that emerges
from its first decades in good condition is guaranteed to remain successful.
Beyond this period, older and newer agencies alike face challenges that can
determine whether they will sustain better performance or if they will suffer
lasting damage. Poland’s experience indicates why a period of twenty to twentyfive years of experience arguably is necessary to assess a regime’s resilience. The
establishment of a competition policy system in Poland in the early 1990s was a
crucial event in the formerly communist states of central and Eastern Europe.82
Poland was an early and continuing barometer for measuring the success of
competition law reforms among the suddenly large and expanding cohort of
transition economies.83 As a result of Poland’s strong commitment to the
76. Interview with Marcelo Calliari, Former Member of CADE, in London, United Kingdom (June
27, 2016).
77. See ANTITRUST IN EMERGING AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 69 for an
informative treatment of developments in Latin America since the mid-1990s. See also ORG. FOR ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND MARKET STUDIES IN LATIN AMERICA (2015); ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., FOLLOW-UP TO NINE PEER REVIEWS OF COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA, EL SALVADOR,
HONDURAS, MEXICO, PANAMA AND PERU (2012); COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN
AMERICA (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009); Claudia Schatan, The Dynamics of
Competition Policies in Small Developing Economies: the Central American Countries’ Experience, in
NEW COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS 91 (Richard Whish & Christopher Townley eds., 2012).
78. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
79. Interview with Julian Pena, Partner, Allende & Brea, Buenos Aries (Nov. 20, 2015).
80. See Aydin, supra note 63 (detailing Mexico’s progression).
81. See GLOB. COMPETITION REV., THE ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS 2016,
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/74/antitrust-review-americas-2016 [https://perma.cc/ACQ8PGPH] (recounting the modern progress of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico).
82. See generally JOHN FINGLETON ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF CENTRAL EUROPE (1996) (describing early development of competition law in the Visegrad nations,
including Poland).
83. See generally Russell Pittman, Competition Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Five Years Later,
43 ANTITRUST BULL. 179 (1998) (highlighting Poland as one of the first countries to adopt competition
laws in the aftermath of the Soviet Union breakup).
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endeavor as well as substantial, prolonged support from the European Union and
United States competition regimes, the Polish Office of Competition and
Consumer Protection became a formidable and well-respected institution.84 The
twentieth birthday of the Polish competition system in 2012 occasioned an
international celebration of the country’s accomplishments, as evidenced by the
creation of a capable team of professionals, the gradual development of effective
advocacy and law enforcement programs, and its leadership for new agencies in
Central and Eastern Europe.85 In April 2013, the Office hosted the International
Competition Network’s Annual Conference, the largest annual gathering of the
world’s competition agencies.86
The past three years have provided jarring reminders that Poland and other
competition agencies can take nothing for granted. In 2014, the head of state
dismissed the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection’s wellregarded chair, Malgorzata Krasnodebska-Tomkiel, over a policy
disagreement.87 Her successor, Adam Jassar, preserved key ingredients of his
predecessor’s program, and added new and useful enhancements; he quickly
dispelled fears that Tomkiel’s ouster foreshadowed a new and unwelcome period
of intrusive political interference in the Office’s operations.88 But in December
2015, new political leadership announced its intent to dismiss Jassar as soon as
his replacement could be arranged.89
Even in the best of circumstances, leadership changes in regulatory agencies
can be a source of considerable anxiety for businesses and the agency’s own
staff.90 It is still more unsettling when the political intervention causes the

84. See generally Michael Wise, Review of Competition Law and Policy in Poland, 5 OECD J. OF
COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 83 (2003) (discussing the development of competition law in Poland and its
role in helping to reshape the Polish economy).
85. See CHANGES IN COMPETITION LAW OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES (Malgorzata
Krasnodebska-Tomkiel ed., 2010) (commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the creation of Poland’s
competition law system).
86. ICN 12th Annual Conference, ICN, www.icnwarsaw2013.org [https://perma.cc/2U3W-ETJY].
87. Interview with Malgorzata Krasnodebska-Tomkiel, Former President of Poland’s UOKIK,
Warsaw, Poland (Oct. 12, 2015); Faaez Samedi, Poland sacks authority head, GLOB. COMPETITION REV.
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/35210/poland-sacks-authority-head/
[https://perma.cc/5KW4-XLLD] (reporting dismissal of Malgorzata Krasnodebska-Tomkiel as head of
Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection).
88. Interview with Malgorzata Krasnodebska-Tomkiel, Former President of Poland’s UOKIK,
Warsaw, Poland (Oct. 12, 2015); Interview with Adam Jasser, President of Poland’s UOKIK, Warsaw,
Poland (Oct. 13, 2015); Katy Oglethorpe, Government advisor to head Polish Authority, GLOB.
COMPETITION REV. (Mar. 19, 2014), available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/
35535/government-advisor-to-head-polish-authority/
[https://perma.cc/W9B3-C4NV]
(reporting
appointment of Adam Jasser to lead Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection).
89. PaRR, 2016 Global Trends Monitor 21 (201/35535/6) (noting dismissal of Adam Jasser as head
of Poland’s UOKIK in January 2016); Tom Madge-Wyld, Poland appoints new competition chief, GLOB.
COMPETITION REV. (May 13, 2016), http://globalcompetitionreview.com /news/article/41049/polandappoints-new-competition-chief/ [https://perma.cc/KY97-CR5Y] (reporting appointment of Marck
Niechcial to replace Adam Jasser as head of Poland’s Office of Competition and Consumer Protection).
90. See generally Kovacic, Partisanship, supra note 37 (describing influence of politics and
partisanship on U.S. antitrust policymaking).
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removal of top management. To undergo multiple politically inspired dismissals
in only a few years would be an immense shock for any agency. The disorienting
effect on the agency itself, with the uncertainty about future programs and the
inevitable shuffling of personnel in the front office and other management
positions, should not be underestimated. External observers would be hardly less
distressed as they wonder about how and when elected officials would intervene
again in the agency’s work. Some agencies have demonstrated the resilience to
bounce back from seemingly abrupt and unanticipated leadership changes that
in some sense were related to a policy clash between the agency’s head and the
country’s political leadership.91 The concern is that such transitions can
undermine the agency’s performance, at least in the short term, and cause serious
reputational damage over the longer term. It takes a long time to climb a tall
mountain; the descent from a misstep generally is much faster.
For the most part, an older, better-established, and more experienced agency
is more likely to be in a stronger position to respond to such blows and recover.
This is because: (a) a better-established and more experienced agency has had
more time to build a career staff that provides continuity and stability over time
and is able to carry out the work of the agency despite significant disruptions in
leadership;92 and (b) such an agency probably has accumulated reputational
capital that it can “spend” in the time of a crisis to maintain its standing in the
eyes of external audiences.93 A relatively newer agency, by contrast, may be more
vulnerable to being swept aside or permanently diminished because it has not
had the opportunity to build a staff of sufficient depth and experience or to build
a reputation that can sustain it in difficult times.
91. Consider two examples. Beatriz Boza, the first head of Peru’s INDECOPI, left her agency after
the political upheaval surrounding the departure of Alberto Fugimori, the country’s president. Fugimori
had brought Boza back to Peru to lead INDECOPI, and his ouster as president led her to leave
INDECOPI. Interview with Beatriz Boza, Former President of INDECOPI, Lima, Peru (Dec. 7, 2011).
In the decade or so after Boza left office, INDECOPI underwent significant policy adjustments under
new leadership. In recent years, the agency appears to have made progress in improving its programs and
stature under the leadership of Hebert Tassano. Interview with Luis Canseco-Diez, Founder,
DiezCanseco, Lima, Peru (Aug. 21, 2016). The second example is the Israel Antitrust Authority. Earlier
this year, the agency’s president, David Gilo announced his resignation after the country’s president
decided to override the antitrust agency’s opposition to a merger of two natural gas companies. Sharon
Udasin, Antitrust Commissioner David Gilo to resign in August amid gas disputes, THE JERUSALEM POST
(May 25, 2015), http://www.jpost.com/Business-and-Innovation/Antitrust-Commissioner-David-Gilo-toresign-in-August-amid-gas-disputes-404017. The resignation raised questions about the future stability
of Israel’s antitrust regime. These concerns have been allayed by the appointment of a highly respected
practitioner, Michal Halperin, who previously had worked at the Israel Antitrust Authority. Ora Coren,
Prominent Lawyer Michal Halperin Named Israel’s New Antitrust Chief, Haaretz (Jan. 27, 2016),
http://www.haaretz.com/Israel-news/business/premium-1.699928 [https://perma.cc/KY97-CR5Y]. All
indications suggest that the leadership transition has proceeded smoothly, and the work of the agency
has not been adversely affected. Interview with David Gilo, Former Chairman of the Antitrust Authority
of Israel, Rhodes, Greece (July 4, 2016).
92. See Kovacic, Partisanship, supra note 37, at 704 (discussing resilience of a long-standing
professional staff).
93. See William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, The Federal Trade Commission as an Independent
Agency: Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2085, 2106–07 (2015) (discussing
how competition agencies accumulate and spend political capital).
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A. Testing The Agency’s Powers
All new competition agencies must work through an initial period where they
apply their powers for the first time. Inevitably, there will be a lag (sometimes
substantial) between the new competition law’s effective date and when its
implementing agency becomes proficient in performing basic tasks associated
with carrying out investigations, gathering evidence, formulating theories of
liability, and prosecuting cases.94 It is one thing to sit in a training seminar to hear
an expert review the analytical foundations of competition law and explain the
conceptual ingredients of something like offenses based on single-firm
misconduct. It is entirely another to identify a potential target for prosecution,
prepare a case, and carry it through a series of judicial appeals.
There is nothing automatic or easy about the launch of a new system and the
learning process that is vital to a successful program. Three basic examples
illustrate the difficulties a new agency confronts in carrying out essential tasks
associated with law enforcement. A necessary first step for a competition agency
is to define its objectives and choose a strategy to achieve its aims.95 Legislators
often seek to achieve a wide range of objectives in passing a competition law.96
The competition agency is left in the difficult position of reconciling the varied—
and sometimes contradictory—policy aims and formulating a coherent
program.97
The second task is more prosaic but no less important: mastering the use of
search warrants or related tools that authorize agencies to collect information or
conduct unannounced inspections of business premises and collect evidence.98
For an agency that has never done one, the dawn raid can be a complex,
bewildering process. A properly executed dawn raid that yields information
useful in preparing a case requires preparing a specific description of the

94. Many senior officials from new competition agencies confirmed for us that none of this is easy
for an agency starting from scratch. Interview with Dragen Penezic, Secretary General, Serbian
Competition Commission, Belgrade, Serbia (April 7, 2016); Interview with Skaidrite Abrama, President,
Latvian Competition Commission, Riga, Latvia (May 8, 2015); Interview with Sarunas Keraskouskas,
Chairman, Lithuanian Competition Commission, Vilnius, Lithuania (September 10, 2015); Interview
with Anna Fornalczyk, Former President, Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of Poland,
Warsaw, Poland (Oct. 13, 2015).
95. See William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband Migration and the Federal Trade Commission:
Building the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 1, 8–9 (2010) (discussing importance of definition of goals and choice of strategy as determinants of
agency effectiveness).
96. See David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the
Goals of Competition Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2163, 2165–69 (2013) (discussing how legislatures seek
to realize multiple policy goals by enacting competition laws). See also DAVID LEWIS, ENFORCING
COMPETITION RULES IN SOUTH AFRICA: THIEVES AT THE DINNER TABLE 111–12, 117–28 (2015)
(describing public interest objectives of South Africa’s competition law).
97. See Winerman & Kovacic, Outpost Years, supra note 35, at 149–57 (recounting struggles of early
FTC to resolve tensions among competing legislative visions of what the agency should accomplish).
98. On the use of these evidence gathering techniques in cartel investigations, see INT’L
COMPETITION NETWORK, ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 1–47 (May 2009), http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc340.pdf [https://perma.cc/74K2-U994].
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materials to be collected, correctly identifying the premises to be searched,
assembling a team of inspectors with a clear idea of what items to seize and what
information to collect (such as passwords for computer systems), a sound
methodology for making an inventory of items taken, an expert in the law
governing searches who can deal with on-site objections raised by business
managers, and, once evidence is collected, a team of forensic specialists who can
analyze and distill the relevant evidence.99 This is further complicated if an agency
must search multiple premises, where the agency must synchronize the timing of
entry to avoid alerting some office managers of the raid’s imminence and thus
giving them an opportunity to conceal or destroy responsive records.100
For a novice agency (and for a few experienced agencies), drafting and
executing a search warrant are tasks fraught with opportunities for error. Most
competition agencies can recount stories about arriving at the business offices
only to discover that the search warrant (usually approved by a magistrate or
other judicial officer) listed the wrong address for the premises to be inspected,
thus rendering the search instrument invalid.101 In other cases, the difficulties go
beyond occasions for simple institutional embarrassment. In some jurisdictions,
the competition agency faces a serious possibility that its employees will
encounter a violent response when they arrive to carry out the dawn raid.102 In
other countries, the danger of terrorist bombings effectively precludes the
competition agency from conducting compulsory searches or even visiting
business premises for voluntary interviews.103
A third example involves applying merger control mechanisms that require
advance notification of certain transactions and impose a suspensory period in
which the parties are barred from closing their deal. Roughly seventy

99. Id. (discussing performance of these tasks).
100. Id. at 15 (“It is a good practice to make entry simultaneously with search teams on other
premises and equip each Team Leader with a mobile phone and the numbers of a central command post
and/or all other relevant team leaders in order to enable continuous coordination.”).
101. The first dawn raid carried out by Portugal’s competition authority is illustrative. When the
agency’s officials came to the premises of the business enterprise to be examined, they discovered that
the firm’s headquarters had moved across the street. Thus, the search warrant listed an address different
from the firm’s current address. The search instrument, as signed by the magistrate, did not authorize the
agency to search the new headquarters facility. The Portuguese authority obtained a new warrant, this
time with the correct address, and executed the search some days later. The search was unproductive,
perhaps because the target enterprise used the interim to move potentially troublesome records to a new
location, or to sweep computers for electronic records. Interview with Mariana Taveras, Former Chief of
Staff to the President of Portugal’s Competition Agency, London, United Kingdom (Jan. 28, 2016).
102. In visits to Russia in the 1990s, Kovacic heard on a number of occasions from officials in the
Federal Antimonopoly Service that some sectors were controlled by mafia-like organizations that would
not hesitate to gun down a government official seeking to present a search warrant. See William E.
Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist
Countries, 11 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 437, 444–45 (1996) (discussing concerns expressed by employees of
the regional offices of the Federal Antimonopoly Service).
103. This is the case for the Competition Committee of Pakistan, which cannot conduct operations
in some violence-prone regions of Pakistan. Interview with Joseph Wilson, Commissioner of the
Competition Commission of Pakistan, Geneva, Switzerland (July 10, 2016).
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jurisdictions have established variants of this process,.104 and all have
underestimated the administrative burdens it entails. The United States created
the prototype for this form of merger control with the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.105 The statute’s implementing regulation
took effect in January 1979, and the first years of its operation were marked by
the U.S. antitrust agencies’ often chaotic efforts—with great resources at their
disposal and long experience with merger analysis—to build internal procedures
to evaluate large bodies information in a relatively short time and to prepare
cases for litigation challenging potentially anti-competitive transactions.106
Nearly every jurisdiction that has traveled this path has found that it takes
considerable time and resources to build capable teams of case handlers to review
proposed transactions, to devise administrative procedures for organizing and
evaluating large amounts of information, to find ways to give informative
disclosure and advice to business planners, and to capture and retain knowledge
gained from practice.107
The experience with merger review points to the vital role of learning in the
development of a competition agency and, more generally, a competition system.
The search for effective methods of policy implementation involves an inevitable
element of experimentation; key focal points include the establishment of
processes to identify promising subjects for investigation, selecting strong cases,
and successfully prosecuting infringements.108 With experimentation comes a mix
of success and failure. There is no shame in failure—only in making a habit of it,
104. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2016, at 450–79 (John Davies ed., 2016).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000). See generally William Blumenthal, Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-Rodino
Merger Enforcement, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 813 (1997) (detailing the origins and effects of the Hart-ScottRodino merger control reforms).
106. See William E. Kovacic, HSR at 35: the Early US Premerger Notification Experience and its
Meaning for New Systems of Competition Law, in NEW COMPETITION JURISDICTIONS 9 (Richard Whish
& Christopher Townley eds., 2012) [hereinafter HSR at 35] (highlighting the early difficulties of the FTC
in implementing a new program of compulsory advance notification of mergers).
107. China provides an informative illustration. In creating its competition law system, China greatly
underestimated the administrative difficulties that its premerger notification system would present.
Twenty people were assigned to the new merger review unit of the Ministry of Commerce—ten
professionals and ten administrative support staff. The badly understaffed bureau has struggled to cope
with the volume of mandatory filings, though staffing increases (the office now numbers approximately
40) and the adoption of a fast-track mechanism for benign transactions has put the office in a better
position to manage the program. See William E. Kovacic, China’s Competition Law Experience in
Context, 3 J. OF ANTITRUST ENF’T SUPP. 1, 2 (2015) (discussing early implementation of China’s
Antimonopoly Law and its merger review mechanism). A similar pattern has emerged in the Philippines,
whose new competition law took effect in May 2016. The law includes a mandatory merger notification
system, which requires merging parties to report proposed transactions in advance and allow the
competition agency an opportunity to review the transaction before it closes. From the effective date of
the law, the new agency’s small professional staff was swamped with merger filings. The first months of
the agency’s operations have been dominated by a struggle to review transactions submitted under the
mandatory notification system. Interview with El Cid Butuyan, Commissioner, Philippines Competition
Commission, Lima, Peru (Aug. 21, 2016).
108. See generally William E. Kovacic, Using Ex Post Evaluation to Improve the Performance of
Competition Authorities, 31 J. CORP. L. 503 (2006) (examining the experimental nature of much policy
making in competition law).
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especially the repetition of past missteps. Successful agencies progress because
they learn: they improve through a three-step process of experimentation,
evaluation, and refinement.109
Thus, one of the most important attributes of successful competition systems
is the establishment of a culture within the competition agency that promotes
continuing critical self-assessment and a commitment to doing better in the
future. The development of what today are seen generally as valuable
enforcement techniques—for example, the use of leniency mechanisms to detect
and deter cartels110—did not occur instantaneously or with immediate success.111
The U.S. system of mandatory premerger notification, discussed above, changed
dramatically from its inception in 1979 to the present as the U.S. antitrust
agencies adjusted reporting requirements and expanded efforts to make the
mechanism’s operation more transparent for affected parties.112 The lesson from
these and other experiences is that a competition agency rarely gets things right
from day one. The real measure of an agency is not where it begins, but how it
learns and progresses.
B. Recruiting And Retaining a Capable Staff
It can take a number of years to see whether an agency has established a
reputation that enables it to attract and retain good attorneys, economists, and
administrative professionals.113 Some agencies never succeed in recruiting
sufficient numbers of capable staff. Others do well in the early years when
enthusiasm for a new program, ambitious enforcement measures, and
charismatic leadership make the agency a desirable employer. A serious test for
such agencies is whether they can effectively become more than an executive
M.B.A. program that identifies good talent for absorption by the private sector
or by other public agencies.
Some countries will find it easier than others to build the necessary critical
mass of human capital. Consider the advantageous initial conditions in which

109. See Kovacic, Partisanship, supra note 37, at 708.
110. On the development of leniency as a powerful, widely employed method for detecting cartels,
see ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: LENIENCY RELIGION (Caron BeatonWells & Christopher Tran eds., 2015) [hereinafter LENIENCY RELIGION].
111. On the difficult and uncertain path that the Department of Justice traveled to transform an
ineffective leniency program, begun in the 1970s, into a potent tool for cartel detection, see Ann O’Brien,
Leadership of Leniency, in LENIENCY RELIGION, supra note 110, at ch. 2. The reforms undertaken in
1993 and 1994 have been supplemented by a variety of enhancements (for example, the establishment of
a marker system to encourage firms to report misconduct as quickly as possible, and the creation of
“amnesty-plus” to spur companies to reveal additional cartels beyond the conspiracy immediately under
investigation) that reflect learning from experience. Interview with Melvin Price, Head of the Criminal
Enforcement Program, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Lima, Peru (Aug. 20, 2016).
112. See Kovacic, HSR at 35, supra note 106 (describing refinements to U.S. premerger notification
system).
113. See generally Kovacic, Respected Brand, supra note 51 (assessing the importance of reputation
and branding to an agency’s performance).
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Singapore established its Competition Commission in 2005.114 Public
administration in Singapore features a longstanding tradition of superb public
institutions staffed by highly qualified personnel and governed by stringent
standards of integrity.115 The Competition Commission of Singapore began its
operations, as new systems inevitably do, in a country with no experience in
competition law. Nonetheless, the new agency had first-rate human capital: the
typical profile for both senior managers and junior case handlers included a first
university degree from Singapore and a second (or further in some cases) degree
from an elite institution outside the country.116 To obtain the necessary expertise
to implement competition laws, Singapore recruited senior managers and
advisors from countries with extensive experience in competition law.117 No
competition agency has enjoyed a better beginning in this respect, and the
Singapore Competition Commission’s tradition of building a staff with
exceptional professional skills continues today.
In many other countries, creating the necessary critical mass of human capital
is a much slower process. This is especially true in the former Soviet republics
and in nations that turned to market-based reforms after a long period of central
planning.118 Even in these circumstances, there are encouraging examples
showing that it is possible to establish a capable team through a deliberate,
gradual recruitment process. Latvia’s and Lithuania’s competition authorities are
members of the cohort of new agencies established in the early to mid-1990s.
Both institutions stand out for their quality of agency leadership and staff
personnel.119 Serbia’s competition agency recently reached its tenth birthday, and
the institution has made considerable progress in raising the professionalism of
its staff.120
114. See generally COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SINGAPORE, THE FIRST DECADE (2015)
(recounting the history of the Competition Commission of Singapore).
115. Our account of the development of competition law in Singapore draws heavily on numerous
interviews that Kovacic conducted with Robert Ian McEwin since the early 2000s. A native Australian
with a doctorate in economics and a law degree, McEwin served for several years on the staff of the
Competition Commission of Singapore from the time of its formation. He witnessed the creation of the
institution and has studied its development closely since.
116. We base this observation on several visits (most recently, in April 2016) with the Competition
Commission of Singapore that Kovacic conducted since the agency was formed in 2005. These visits have
provided information about the backgrounds of the Commission’s managers and case handlers.
117. Interview with Han Li Toh, Director General, Competition Commission of Singapore, London,
United Kingdom (June 23, 2016).
118. See Kovacic, Entrepreneur, supra note 50, at 451–60 (discussing limits on talent available to staff
competition agencies in formerly planned economies); Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1,
at 305–06.
119. We base this observation on site visits that Kovacic made to the Latvian authority in May 2015
and December 2015 and to the Lithuanian authority in September 2015.
120. Interviews with Dragen Penezic, Secretary General, Commission for Protection of Competition
in the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, Serbia (April 11–12, 2016). Kovacic had the opportunity to meet
with the entire board of the Serbian authority on April 12 to discuss the agency’s development. Several
factors have accounted for improvements in the professionalism of the Serbian authority’s professional
staff. The agency (a) formed closer ties with academics at local universities to identify promising
candidates for recruitment; (b) strengthened internal training programs; and (c) expanded efforts to
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The experience of these and other agencies shows that it is possible to attain
requisite levels of capacity, yet it also demonstrates that accumulating necessary
skills will take considerable time in many jurisdictions. Consider why the
jurisdictions showing progress—for example, Latvia, Lithuania, and Serbia—
have built good teams. Several ingredients are important: agency leadership that
recognizes the importance of human capital to the institution and makes
recruitment and retention a high priority from the start; the initiation of a
sufficient number of law enforcement or other initiatives that showcase the
attractions of competition law as a career and the special experience that
employment with the competition agency can offer; the creation of links to the
university community that draw promising students to the agency; and the
establishment of a career development program for employees, including an
internal academy for training in concepts and practical skills, and opportunities
to participate in professional development programs—such as conferences and
workshops—outside the agency.
Efforts to establish a talented professional staff in many countries take place
without the benefit of university programs that teach courses in competition
economics and law in early phases of the competition system.121 But successful
competition law systems and other regulatory regimes invariably draw upon
indigenous academic hubs that teach competition law and industrial organization
economics, and generate research that informs policy development.122 Here, too,
the formation of these capabilities from scratch is an important but difficult and
lengthy process.123
C. Predictable Challenges In, And Resistance From, The Courts
In nearly every jurisdiction with a competition law, initial efforts to exercise
the enforcement agency’s powers have elicited robust challenges in the courts by
affected firms.124 Most agencies spend at least a decade defending challenges to
every significant aspect of their authority, including the power to gather
information, the application of the substantive mandate to challenge business
behavior, and the power to impose sanctions.125 It can easily take two decades or
attract lateral candidates with substantial experience in law firms or other government agencies. Success
in attracting higher quality staff also depended on the agency’s ability to portray itself as an exciting,
dynamic place to pursue a career. Another example of an agency that is seeking to upgrade its staff as a
means for improvement is Argentina. The Argentina Competition Commission is undergoing a major
makeover and has added thirty new professionals in the current year. Interview with Pablo Trevisan,
Commissioner, Argentina Competition Commission, New York, New York (Oct. 28, 2016).
121. See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 272 (describing importance of indigenous
academic bodies).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See generally Marc Winerman & William E. Kovacic, Outpost Years for a Start-Up Agency: The
FTC from 1921–1925, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 145 (2010) (detailing the early travails of the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission before the federal courts).
125. We derive this estimate from conversations with current and former competition agency heads
who described the early experience of their agencies before the courts. See, e.g., Interview with Eduardo
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more for an agency to obtain judicial rulings—often from the jurisdiction’s
highest court—that either sustain the agency’s efforts to exercise its legal
mandate, or make clear that further legislative reforms are necessary.126
In most jurisdictions, courts in the early implementation period are likely to
regard the competition law with wariness or ambivalence.127 Few judges will have
any previous familiarity with competition law concepts.128 As a consequence,
judges will tend to focus closely on apparent deviations from procedural
requirements established in the competition law or imposed by the jurisdiction’s
administrative procedure code.129 In Mexico, for example, the competition
system’s first decade was stymied by the judicial habit of routinely issuing
injunctions to cure apparent failures by the competition agency to abide by
procedural mandates.130 Programs that provide judicial training in competition
law can improve the capacity of courts to deal with substantive issues, but these
programs take time to develop, even if only to create interest among judges to
participate in the training exercises.
D. Responding To Changes In Agency Leadership
It is important to monitor how an agency fares following leadership changes.
Some agencies have gotten off to a seemingly great start by reason of highly
visible and capable leadership. Many of these have descended rapidly in

Perez Motta, Former President of Mexico’s Competition Commission, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 2016);
Interview with Joseph Wilson, Commissioner, Competition Commission of Pakistan, Geneva,
Switzerland (July 15, 2016).
126. We base this estimate on discussions with current and former heads of competition agencies who
described their agencies’ early experiences before the courts. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying
text. In some jurisdictions, the initial period of judicial interpretation might be shorter. The 20-year
estimate reflects the time needed, in most jurisdictions, for the agency to begin to exercise its powers and
to issue decisions, for the parties to seek judicial review, and for matters to make their way to decision
by the highest court in the jurisdiction. There may be several trips to the nation’s highest courts—for
example, one litigation cycle to test the agency’s powers to use compulsory process to gather information,
and a separate cycle to test the agency’s interpretation of the law and the evidence before it. We also
note the experience of the Federal Trade Commission, which required decades to gain judicial
endorsement of key elements of its authority. See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission
and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L. REV. 587, 611–17 (1982) [hereinafter
Congressional Oversight].
127. See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 306 (discussing weaknesses of courts in
transition economies); Kovacic, Perspectives, supra note 49, at 1211. In many conversations about his
experiences in transition economies, Frederic Jenny has emphasized the tendency of judges in civil law
jurisdictions to focus carefully on issues of procedural and administrative correctness and to shrink from
engaging in the economic and legal issues presented by many competition law cases. This explanation
matches experience in the first decade of Mexico’s law, where the courts scanned the work of the
competition agency for procedural imperfections. Interview with Eduardo Perez Motta, Former
President, Mexican Competition Commission, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 7, 2016).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Aydin, Competition Law and Policy in Mexico, supra note 63, at 170–71; Sergio GarciaRodriguez, Mexico’s New Institutional Framework for Antitrust Enforcement, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1149,
1177 (1995) (In mid-1990s, Mexico’s “judicial system is perceived by many as plagued with considerable
delays, institutional corruption, and a lack of independence”).
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performance when the first generation leader departs and a less capable
successor takes office. Newer agencies, just like older agencies, can suffer from
the rivalry and jealousy that can characterize relationships between current and
former leaders.131 As illustrated by the Polish example, several handoffs will be
necessary to determine if the government remains committed to appointing high
quality officials and whether the agency succeeds in embedding good process and
analytical capability in the institution itself—rather than relying chiefly on the
skill of a given leader. After several leadership changes, it is also possible to assess
whether leaders have accepted a norm that defines success in terms of the
agency’s achievements and suppresses the impulse for individual credit-claiming
and blame-casting.
E. Overcoming Economic And Political Shocks
The first twenty to twenty-five years of a competition system’s operation
provide a rough idea of its capacity to respond to external economic and political
shocks that occur, in various forms, in all jurisdictions. At some point, often in
the first decades of its existence, a competition system will be tested by economic
or political upheaval. Like a sailing ship lashed by a storm, the agency must
manage to stay afloat during the immediate crisis and to resume its intended
course once the conflict has abated.132 No competition agency, old or new, will
survive if it takes its political support’s depth and durability for granted, or
assumes that social acceptance of competition as a principle of economic

131. We offer an example based on conversations with current and former officials of a transition
economy competition agency that had an older law but received a significant upgrade during the 2000s.
The officials asked that the identity of the jurisdiction not be disclosed. The first head of the retooled
agency undertook an ambitious program of enforcement. The first chair departed, and the original chair’s
successor (who had been a protégé of the chair) developed an acrimonious relationship with the original
chair. The original chair publicly accused the successor of professional misconduct and privately criticized
the work of the agency after the handover of leadership. The successor matched the original chair blowfor-blow in public discussions and in private conversations. Kovacic visited the headquarters of the
agency and saw a wall on which the photographs of all previous members of the commission appeared,
save one—the picture of the previous chair and voluble critic of the current chair. The empty space in
the gallery stood out. Kovacic asked the current chair about the omission. The current chair replied that
the photograph would not be displayed during the current chair’s tenure. The feud did nothing to advance
the cause of the agency.
132. An instructive example involving an older competition system is the response of the European
Union’s Competition Directorate to the financial crisis that began in 2008. The desperation to restore the
soundness of banks within the European Union created extreme pressures to override existing
competition law requirements, including the regime that limits state aid. The Commissioner for
Competition (Neelie Kroes) fought a valiant and successful battle to sustain the role of the Competition
Directorate in scrutinizing state subsidies, including bailouts for financial institutions. The crisis had the
possibility for severely damaging the Competition Directorate’s role in economic policymaking and, for
the longer term, diminishing its effectiveness. We are grateful to Philip Lowe, who served as Director
General for the Competition Directorate during the crisis, for recounting this episode in numerous
conversations over the past five years. See also An Interview with Sir Philip Lowe, Non-Executive Director
of the Board of the UK Competition and Markets Authority, 11 COMPETITION L. INT’L 99, 104–05 (Oct.
2015) (recounted some aspects of DG Competition’s response to the financial crisis that began in 2008).
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organization is so profound and enduring that no shift in economic fortunes can
unseat it.133
All agencies have encountered challenges that test their ability to take a
punch and keep fighting. Vigorous law enforcement can create political backlash
that inspires ministers and legislators to intervene destructively in the
competition agency’s work.134 Changes in economic conditions can erode support
for competition as a principle of economic organization.135 Political support also
can evaporate amid political upheaval or conflict: political upheaval can render
competition law a subordinate political concern, or make the competition regime
entirely irrelevant.136 These challenges are daunting for older agencies, and are
even more taxing for relatively new systems. Even a new system that appears to
have weathered its early years in good condition and set a sound foundation for
future improvements can be bruised by economic and political upheaval.137
One other trend characterizes the development of new systems and the
impact of economic and political shocks. In many countries, the initial design of
a competition regime places the new institution within a government ministry or
other departments subject to control of elected officials.138 This can be
interpreted as the political regime’s distrust of the new system. Or somewhat
more positively, it can be viewed as a desire to place the new institution under
closer observation.139 Over a period of years, many countries with new systems
have been willing to give the competition agency greater autonomy.140 Thus,
133. See generally William E. Kovacic, Congress and the Federal Trade Commission, 57 ANTITRUST
L.J. 869 (1988) (discussing periodic legislative assaults on FTC’s authority and specific enforcement
matters since 1914).
134. See Kovacic, Congressional Oversight, supra note 126, at 623–27, 664–67 (describing episodes of
destructive congressional intervention in FTC’s programs).
135. A good case can be made that the U.S. competition laws did not become mainstream elements
of national economic policy until the late 1930s, following the abandonment of central planning initiatives
tried in the First New Deal. TONY A. FREYER, ANTITRUST AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 1930–2004, 8–
59 (2006); TONY A. FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN AND
AMERICA 1880–1990, 196–232 (1992).
136. We offer the examples of Egypt and Ukraine. Egypt’s competition system got off to a promising
start following the adoption of a competition law in 2005. It recruited well and created a strong
administrative infrastructure under its first chair, Mona Yassine. Less than a decade later, a series of
tumultuous political events rocked the competition system and, for a time, essentially suspended the
operation of the competition regime. In recent years, the Egyptian Competition Agency has gotten back
on its feet and restored its program. Ukraine was a generally encouraging case from the passage of the
country’s antimonopoly act in the early 1990s. Within the past five years, the country has undergone a
political revolution, the occupation of substantial territory in its eastern regions, and grave economic
distress. Over the past year, the Antimonpoly Committee of Ukraine has undergone a basic makeover
and can now be likened to a new start-up agency.
137. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
138. See Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Results of the George Washington University Global
Competition Benchmarking Survey (2016) [hereinafter Benchmarking] (describing patterns in location
of competition agencies within the framework of government).
139. This also could be seen as a willingness of a country to provide political support for the new
institution. See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 29–32.
140. See supra note 130 and accompanying text describing change in status of Mexico’s competition
agency.
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agencies that initially were subject to closer political control have gained a greater
measure of independence over time.
F. Demonstrating Resilience
To a large degree, all of these considerations reveal the competition system’s
resilience. It takes at least twenty years to see if the agency has generated positive
accomplishments like successfully attacking cartels or adjusting anti-competitive
government policies in response to effective advocacy. But this time period is also
required for the agency to demonstrate its ability to take a punch and keep
moving forward.
These punches can take many forms: a major case that fails in the courts, a
powerful industry lobbying campaign to induce legislators to withdraw funding
or authority, an improper disclosure of confidential information that casts doubt
on the agency’s procedural safeguards, or, worse, an episode of corruption
involving a top agency official.141 It is important to know if the agency can cope
well with adversity and, if it has committed errors, repair problems and improve
performance going forward.
An agency’s resilience is further tested when a jurisdiction restructures the
institutions responsible for implementation. Over the past ten years, a number of
jurisdictions have made fundamental changes to their competition agencies.
France, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom each took two separate
national competition agencies and consolidated policy responsibility into single
institutions.142 Brazil combined the competition responsibilities of three distinct
bodies into a single authority.143 Ireland merged its competition agency and
consumer protection authority into one institution.144 After creating a single
competition agency from two existing bodies, Spain then formed an omnibus
regulatory body consisting of the competition agency and six sectoral
regulators.145
Such structural realignment can be a source of considerable upheaval. The
new institution must perform both challenging conceptual tasks—for example,
how to define the purpose and identity of the new institution—and seemingly
mundane administrative tasks—such as joining up two separate information
technology systems—whose successful completion is necessary for a smooth
transition. The transition from the predecessor institutions to the new
configuration, from the announcement of the planned redesign through the
141. Experience with Indonesia’s competition system provides such a grim example. One of its
commissioners has been convicted of taking a bribe in 2008 in connection with an abuse of dominance
matter.
142. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agency Design: What’s On the Menu?, 8
EUR. COMPETITION J. 527, 528–29 (2012) (describing structural changes in France, Portugal, Spain and
the United Kingdom).
143. Id. The Netherlands also merged its consumer protection authority, its competition agency, and
the regulator responsible for postal services and telecommunications into one entity.
144. Lopez-Galdos, Benchmarking, supra note 138.
145. See generally id.
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launch and early operations of the new body, creates an inevitable amount of
disarray and comes at some cost in effectiveness.146
G. Realistic Expectations
The factors set out here caution against embracing unrealistic expectations
about what a new competition system is likely to achieve in its first decade or two.
Part IV explains that the performance of a competition system depends crucially
on matters such as funding and human capital.147 Competition agencies that are
weakly funded and situated in jurisdictions with a weak talent pool must
implement the law more gradually than agencies blessed with substantial
financial resources and first-rate talent can.148 Even for the best-resourced agency
with superb staff, it can take considerable time to become proficient in tasks such
as law enforcement or competition advocacy. There is no such thing as an “easy”
cartel case or “simple” dawn raid for an agency that has never done one.149 The
essential architecture of a leniency program may seem fairly straightforward
(give immunity for the first cartel member to inform), but the routine application
of leniency schemes presents extraordinary complexities that can perplex even
the most-experienced regimes.150
There is a chronic tendency to underestimate the administrative burdens
imposed by statutory or regulatory requirements that compel the competition
agency to devote resources to certain types of matters. Examples include
compulsory merger notification with mandatory waiting periods and
administrative law requirements that force the agency to investigate all
complaints brought to its attention with little or no discretion to brush aside

146. The announcement of an intended structural change—either a merger of agencies or functions,
or a divestiture of some policy duties—immediately inspires speculation within the staff of the affected
agencies about their place in the new regime. The uncertainties associated with a realignment will cause
some employees to pursue other career opportunities. When departures reach a certain level, vital
institutional memory walks out the door.
147. See infra Part IV.
148. See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 298–301 (discussing possibilities for
phased introduction of competition law system); Rodriguez & Menon, supra note 15.
149. We have not conducted a systematic survey, but our interviews suggested that many new agencies
take years before conducting their first dawn raid. The Competition Authority of Kenya, for example,
performed its first dawn raid shortly after the fifth anniversary of the creation of the agency. Interview
with Francis Kariuki, Director General, Competition Authority of Kenya, Nairobi, Kenya (Sept. 14,
2016). Serbia’s competition authority conducted its first dawn raid in its tenth year. Interview with
Dragen Penezic, Secretary General, Commission for Protection of Competition in the Republic of Serbia,
Belgrade, Serbia (Apr. 11–12, 2016).
150. In no particular order, a list of complications includes the following issues: the treatment of
informants who were deeply involved in the formation of a cartel, but also are offering high quality
evidence to the prosecutor; the level of protection to be given to informants who are not first to report
wrongdoing, but have evidence whose quality surpasses that provided the first application; the
completeness of information the leniency applicant must provide to qualify for immunity; the relationship
of leniency to private rights of action for damages (for example, whether a party seeking compensation
for injuries may obtain access to information provided by the leniency applicant). Interview with Marvin
Price, Head of the Criminal Section, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Lima, Peru (Aug. 20,
2016).
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manifestly insignificant matters in favor of pursuing more economically
meaningful priorities.151 There is a lengthy learning process by which agencies
adapt to cope effectively with these and similar mandates.
This article’s call for realism in assessing the implementation experience of
any single agency is grounded in the value of comparative study. In response to a
question about how an individual competition agency is performing, one might
ask, “Compared to what?” The comparative perspective provides a more reliable
view of what agencies are able to do. If a large number of hardworking, intelligent
people require a certain amount of time to complete certain tasks, it is unrealistic
to expect others to do notably better. As in sport, incremental advances in
performance can be expected over time, and specific agencies may achieve major
advances with respect to some tasks. On the whole, progress takes place in
smaller steps, and “records” in this field generally are not broken in giant leaps.
IV
LIFECYCLES
The accumulated experience of new systems since the late 1980s
demonstrates three principal implementation trajectories: an initial ascent
followed by decline; a flat line; and a gradual upward progression. This article
calls these trajectories lifecycles. They suggest patterns in how agencies evolve,
and the study of the patterns can inform agencies about what to expect as they
seek to implement a competition law.
A. Early Ascent Followed By Decline
One cohort of systems rose early and then entered a sustained period of
decline. In some cases, the first period consisted of a sharp vertical ascent
followed by a descent almost as dramatic as the initial climb. Venezuela’s
competition system fits this profile.152 In the early years, such agencies are often
heralded as success stories.153 A strong first-generation leader—for example, Ana
Julia Jatar in Venezuela—who succeeds in bringing superior talent into the
agency in its first years typically propels this ascent.154 The decline is set in motion
by various factors: the charismatic leader’s departure without the development

151. COMESA initially set low reporting thresholds for mergers subject to its regional merger review
mechanism. The low thresholds generated additional income for COMESA (because more transactions
were reportable) but at the cost of straining the capacity of the small secretariat assigned to review
transactions. Interview with George Lipimile, Director General, COMESA Competition Unit, New
York, New York (Oct. 28, 2016).
152. Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Noches De Boda Para El Derecho De La Competencia En Venezuela
[Venezuela’s Competition Law’s Honeymoon], GACETA JURIDICIA DE LA UNION EUROPEA Y DE LA
COMPETENCIA (May 2007).
153. Ana Julia Jatar, Venezuela Competition Policy: The Promotion of Social Change, in
COMPETITION POLICY, DEREGULATION, AND MODERNIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA (Moises Naim
ed., 1999).
154. See Kovacic, Entrepreneur, supra note 50, at 456–57 (describing role of Ana Julia Jatar in
establishment of Venezuela’s competition agency).
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of an institutional framework to carry on the agency’s work; a change in national
political leadership that results in a redirection of policy; or a legal dispute that
casts doubt on the legitimacy of the framework.155
In some instances, the collapse associated with this scenario is not complete,
but rather a noticeable descent from the early period of seemingly effective
implementation. Argentina and Peru are prominent examples in this category.156
The agency does not crash into the ground, but descends to a level of
performance that is decidedly modest compared to its initial accomplishments. In
this case, the agency stalls for some of the same reasons suggested above. It may
also decline after a change in leadership that dramatically reorients the agency,
like the political upheaval which led to the departure of Beatriz Boza and the
curtailment of INDECOPI’s authority in Peru,157 or in response to the emergence
of political philosophies questioning the value of market-oriented reforms as in
Argentina.158
Political turmoil inspired by discontent with market reforms deeply affects
the competition law regime. In some instances, anti-market political movements
have placed the competition policy system into a holding pattern during which
the best case scenario is that the agency can hope to retain a critical mass of its
top staff, who devote themselves during the hiatus to research and analysis tasks
in anticipation of a future resumption of operations.159 In the worst case, the
repudiation of market processes converts the competition agency into a
Frankenstein’s monster, retarding, rather than promoting, competition.
In some instances, political upheaval has been debilitating. In recent years, a
political and economic crisis in Ukraine, coupled with the Russian annexation of
Crimea and a war in the country’s eastern regions, has threatened to destroy a
competition system that was formed in the early 1990s and had shown gradual,
though uneven, progress in its first two decades.160 In 2014, economic and political

155. Bruce M. Owen, Competition Policy in Latin America (Oct. 2003) (Stanford Law and Economics
Olin Working Paper No. 268), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=456441 [https://perma.cc/E5EBFZ4W].
156. Anna Julia Jatar & Luis Tineo, Five Years of Competition Policy in Peru: Challenges in the
Transition to a Market Economy, in PERU’S EXPERIENCE IN MARKET REGULATORY REFORM:
LESSONS FROM THE FIRST FIVE YEARS OF INDECOPI: 1992–1998 (Beatriz Boza ed., 1998).
157. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., PERU – PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY, 15–16 (2004), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/34728182.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HMK9-HMV5] (outlining the narrowing of Indecopi’s powers in the early 2000s).
158. See Julian Pena, Promoting Competition Policies from the Private Sector in Latin America, in
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 469 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds.,
2009) (discussing how retreat from market liberalization impeded development of competition law in
Argentina).
159. This arguably describes the situation faced by competition authorities in countries such as
Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
160. The largely successful launch and early implementation of Ukraine’s competition system is
recounted in Roger Alan Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy in Ukraine, 31 GEO. WASH. J.
INT’L L. 1 (1997). The second decade of Ukraine’s competition regime features positive contributions,
but several elements of the system attracted criticism, especially its merger control mechanism. See
UNCTAD Ukraine Peer Review, supra note 41, at 7–8, 23–24 (reviewing accomplishments of Ukraine’s
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turmoil pressed the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine to the edge of its
existence161 Among other consequences, the crisis led Ukraine’s government to
impose drastic economic austerity measures, including a seventy percent cut in
the Antimonopoly Commission’s budget, which forced most agency officials to
take involuntary half-time leave and caused numerous managers and staff to
leave the agency.162 In mid-2015, the government reconstituted the
Antimonopoly Commission with a new chair and a new board.163 To a significant
degree, the institution is, in effect, being re-created from the ground up.
Egypt’s competition system provides a similar example. While it enjoyed a
promising start with good funding and inspired leadership, the country’s political
turmoil following the Arab Spring uprising placed the competition policy system
into virtual suspension. During this time, the agency has strived to retain, with
mixed success, many of its best professionals, who devoted themselves during the
hiatus to research and analysis tasks in anticipation of a future resumption of
operations.164
These examples do not mean that agencies cannot rebound from decline
following a promising start. In Argentina, the recent regime change has yielded
a new commitment to improve the performance of the competition system and
the appointment of capable new leadership to the competition agency.165
Additionally, there are promising signs of improvement in Peru, a country whose
system once stood atop the ladder in Latin American and is now striving to regain
that position.166 At this year’s Annual Conference of the International
Competition Network in Singapore, Peru’s competition agency was honored for

competition system and noting areas for improvement, including merger control).
161. Interview with Yuri Yevgenev, Chairman, Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine
(July 22, 2016).
162. Id.
163. Id. See also Interview with Yuriy Terentyev, Chairman, Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine,
15 ANTITRUST SOURCE 6 (July 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
antitrust_source/aug16_full_source.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR7C-ATRE] (discussing
restoration of Ukraine competition agency).
164. On the turbulent political conditions in Egypt following the Arab Spring revolution and its
effects on Egypt’s competition system, see Peter Speelman, Competition Law in the Middle East and
Northern Africa: The Experiences of Gunisia, Jordan, and Egypt, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L & P. 1227, 1245–50
(Summer 2016). See also Waleed Shoukry, Egypt: Overview, in THE AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN
ANTITRUST REVIEW 2015 17, 18 (Glob. Competition Rev. 2014) (“The past three years have been a
period of political cynicism, unprecedented violence and economic dislocation in Egypt. Competition
law was one of the tools that was used to target businessmen and market players who were close to the
presidential palace.”). More recently, the Egyptian Competition Authority has had success in restoring
its law enforcement program and, generally, resuming normal operations. Interview with Mona El Garf,
GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/
42073/an-interview-mona-el.garf/ [https://perma.cc/ZR3J-2U5Y].
165. Argentina announces new authority head, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Feb. 2016), http://global
competitionreview.com/news/article/40525/argentina-announces-new-head-authority/ [https://perma.cc/
53PC-HUVE].
166. We base this observation on discussions that Kovacic conducted with INDECOPI’s staff and
leadership in Lima, Peru on August 19–21, 2016.
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its program to discourage other government bodies (for example, legislatures,
other regulatory agencies) from adopting competition-retarding policies.167
B. The Flat Line
A second trajectory resembles a flat line. Some new systems never get off the
ground after the adoption of the law and the formation of the competition
agency. For various reasons, they are unable to apply their nominal powers to
enforce the law or perform advocacy tasks.168 Some systems fail to receive the
minimum necessary levels of funding. This ordinarily occurs in jurisdictions that
suffer from severe poverty and do not enjoy financial support from external
sources such as foreign aid agencies or multinational donors, which can
supplement the budget.169 In other systems, like Paraguay’s, an absence of
political support for competition law has stalled implementation. This can be the
result of the appointment of leaders who are committed to inactivity or be due to
a conscious refusal to provide needed resources.170 For example, in the
Dominican Republic, the competition agency still awaits the appointment of an
official who, by law, must approve the initiation of law enforcement proceedings,
five years after its creation.171 The Dominican Republic agency has established a
substantial program to train its personnel and, it engages in advocacy measures
like public education; yet the agency is unable to apply enforcement powers that,
on the surface, were a major reason for the creation of the regime.172 In yet other
countries, such as Thailand, the courts have struck down a key feature of the
implementation mechanism, and the jurisdiction’s political leadership has not
adopted a substitute device.173

167. World Bank, Winners Announced for Global Competition Advocacy Contest (Apr. 28, 2016),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2016/04/28/winners-announced-for-globalcompetition-advocacy-contest (recognizing Peru for “embedding competition principles in public and
industrial policies through advocacy).
168. See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1.
169. See, e.g., Cynthia Clement et al., Competition Policies for Growth: Legal and Regulatory
Framework for Sub-Saharan African Countries (IRIS Center, University of Maryland, 2001) (describing
resource impediments to development of competition policy in various African countries).
170. See Julian Pena, Promoting Competition Policies from the Private Sector in Latin America, in
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 469 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds.,
2009) (discussing impact of erosion of political support for competition law and other market-oriented
reforms in Latin America).
171. Interview with Michelle Cohen, President, Commission for the Defense of Competition,
Dominican Republic, Geneva, Switzerland (July 7, 2015). In September, Cohen was fired by the
Domincan Republic’s Chamber of Deputies. More questions into firing of Dominican competition
watchdog chief, Domican Today, (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/local/
2016/9/15/60609/More-questions-into-firing-of-Dominican-competition-watchdog-chief [https://perma.
cc/EM3Z-8A4Y]. News reports have indicated that Cohen was dismissed in response the business
community’s objections to Cohen’s exercise of the Pro Competencia’s advocacy and reporting functions.
172. Interview with Michelle Cohen, supra note 171.
173. R. Ian McEwin, Designing Competition Law under Financial Crisis: Indonesia and Thailand
Compared, 10 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2014, at 247 (describing barriers to enforcement of
Thailand’s competition law). Thailand’s government is considering proposals to cure this deficiency and
otherwise strengthen the powers and status of the country’s competition authority. Interview with
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Agencies which have risen quickly and fallen and agencies what have never
left the flat line are not irretrievably failed. In some cases, largely inactive
agencies have begun to build programs that have promise of upward progression.
For example, Armenia’s competition authority has recently shown signs of
overcoming badly inadequate funding levels and an unfavorable political
environment to take steps that could establish a useful program.174 Similarly,
elected political leadership in Argentina is beginning to place the competition
regime on better institutional footing and rely more heavily on competition
policy to improve economic growth.175 The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine
is in the early stages of rehabilitation following a political crisis that nearly
destroyed the agency.176
What explains the ability of dormant systems, or weakly performing
institutions, to gain the resources and political support needed to improve? In
some instances, international organizations have helped inspire reforms by
recommending improvements in the competition law system, including
enhancements of the agency’s legal mandate, its resources, or its structure. The
peer reviews issued by bodies such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development appear to have helped catalyze changes in government
policy.177
C. General Upward Progression
The third trajectory is a generally upward progression with fluctuations
upward and downward. The slope of progress can vary: some systems’ slopes are
steep (Brazil, Singapore, South Africa) while others’ are more gradual
(Barbados, Chile, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Mexico). The trajectory usually is
not an unbroken upward arc because the agency encounters successes and
setbacks along the way. Mexico, for example, has achieved important
improvements in its statutory framework and in the implementation of its law
enforcement and advocacy programs. Yet, a recent redesign of the agency and a
change in leadership resulted in a massive loss of senior management (with the
departure of seventeen of the agency’s top eighteen managers in 2015).178
Robert Ian McEwin, New York, New York (Oct. 28, 2016).
174. UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., VOLUNTARY PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION
LAW AND POLICY: ARMENIA (Aug. 2010), http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/ditcclp20101_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V52Q-YFA7].
175. Interview with Esteban Grecco, Chairman of the Argentina’s Competition Commission, Mexico
City, Mexico (May 16, 2016); Macri relanza la Comision Nacional de Competencia, DIARIO LA GACETA
(Feb. 2016), http://www.gacetamercantil.com/notas/95421/ [https://perma.cc/PNM7-89UX].
176. See ANTITRUST SOURCE, supra note 163 and accompanying text.
177. At their best, peer reviews put the weight of a larger international community behind suggested
reforms and give advocates of change a stronger basis for proposing improvements.
178. Interview with Alejandra Palacios, President, Federal Competition Commission of Mexico,
Mexico City (May 16, 2016); see also Interview with Alejandra Palacios, Chair, COFECE, Mexico, 15
ANTITRUST SOURCE 5 (June 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_
source/jun16_palacios_intrvw_6_17f.authcheckdam.pdf (“As an authority, we have experienced
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Restocking the leadership team took time and came at some cost in performance
in the short term.
In their first years, these gradually ever more successful systems often are not
identified as rising stars. Recall that the competition regimes of Chile and Mexico
were not seen as obvious candidates for success. However, over time, they have
shown steady improvement and grown resilient as a result of better resourcing,
staffing, program selection, and political support. A second factor is a regime
change which brings in new political leadership committed to making
competition law a more central element of national economic policy. Just as a
regime change can affect a competition system adversely, new political leadership
can revive an ailing competition mechanism.179
V
FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR IMPLEMENTATION SUCCESS
Studying the lifecycles of various competition systems involves observing
factors that tend to improve the prospects for successful implementation.
A. Funding
Well-funded agencies generally tend to outperform poorly resourced
regimes.180 A condition that links many of the least successful systems is a dearth
of resources from internal sources and an inability to enlist external donors to fill
the gap.181 Some agencies enjoy robust financial support from their first days
onward but a large budget from the start is by no means a prerequisite for success.
Singapore and South Africa are two examples of agencies that have undergone
gradual, steady improvements in implementation from the beginning.182 In other

profound changes in the last two years.”).
179. This condition describes current efforts by new political leadership to bolster Argentina’s
competition system. See Interview with Esteban Manuel Greco, President of the National Commission
for the Defense of Competition, Argentina, 15 ANTITRUST SOURCE 5 (June 2016), https://www.
competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CPI-Talks-Greco-Interview.pdf
(“Argentina has a new approach to competition policy and this implies in the first place an intention to
activgate competition law enforcement and competition policy.”).
180. Agency Effectiveness Study, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 2 (forthcoming 2016) (discussing importance
of adequate funding to competition agency effectiveness). Substantial resources do not ensure
effectiveness. See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1. Public and private bodies, alike, sometimes apply
generous outlays poorly. We are aware of one newer agency that devotes a third of its budget to the
motor pool; top officials are assigned an automobile and driver. Yet a dearth of funding places an agency
at a severe disadvantage.
181. Latin American enforcers bemoan administrative hurdles, GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (May
2016).
182. South Africa provides a good example of how the government underscored its support for the
new competition system with the budget. The first quarters for the new Competition Commission of
South Africa and the Tribunal in which it brings its cases was an elegant office park near Pretoria. The
campus resembled the accommodations one might expect from a prosperous law firm or business
venture. The institutions since have been relocated to facilities in Johannesburg, yet still in a manner that
reflects the stature and importance of the competition agencies. Interview with Tembinkosi Bonakele,
Chairman, Competition Commission of South Africa, Durbin, South Africa (Nov. 10, 2015).
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jurisdictions, such as Colombia and Mexico, the gradual ascent of the competition
system has benefited from periodic substantial increases in outlays that enhanced
the capability of the competition agency and supported the pursuit of more
ambitious law enforcement and advocacy programs.183 Agencies that
demonstrate their ability to manage and apply a lesser allotment of resources
place themselves in a stronger position to seek greater outlays in the future.
B. Human Capital
Funding, in turn, deeply influences a second vital condition: the ability to
attract and retain top rate talent and to spend funds for external consultants.184
An agency’s ability to establish effective law enforcement or advocacy programs
hinges largely on its human capital.185 As the agency’s talent increases, it can
undertake more ambitious programs. The level of skill should be paramount in
the choice of enforcement and non-enforcement matters.
C. Matching Commitments To Capabilities
The more effective competition systems strive to match program
commitments to delivery capabilities. A weakly resourced agency must strive to
select programs that it has a fighting chance of carrying out successfully. This
requires strong discipline in program selection to avoid making commitments to
matters that the agency cannot execute successfully.186 A common trap an agency
faces in early years is the tendency to begin a large number of highly ambitious
matters that exceed the capability of staff and run serious risks of failure before
the courts.187
This points to a basic dilemma that confronts agency leaders in the early
decades of a competition agency, and, perhaps, other new regulatory bodies:

183. Interview with Alejandra Palacios, President, Mexican Competition Commission, Mexico City,
Mexico (May 16, 2016).
184. This is a crucial consideration in Ukraine’s current efforts to reinvigorate its competition system,
which was formed in the early 1990s. The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine pays its professional
staff roughly $200 per month. Without an increase in budget and flexibility to increase wages, Ukraine’s
competition agency will struggle to recruit and retain skilled professionals. Interview with Yuri
Yevgenev, Chairman, Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine, Kiev, Ukraine (July 22, 2016).
185. Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, The Development of Human Capital in Latin American Competition Policy,
in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 13 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds.,
2009) (detailing the difficulties associated with building this crucial dimension of capacity in transition
economies).
186. Hyman & Kovacic, Consume or Invest, supra note 58, at 318–21 (setting out measures to ensure
that agency has ability to undertake initiatives successfully).
187. See infra notes 190–91 and accompanying text (discussing case of Pakistan’s competition
commission). This problem is not limited to newer competition systems. The U.S. Federal Trade
Commission underwent a major make-over in the 1970s in response to criticism that the agency had
focused overwhelmingly on trivial matters and had avoided dealing with conduct that posed serious harm
to consumers. In seeking to bolster its program in the 1970s, the agency initiated an extraordinary array
of competition and consumer protection matters that badly outstripped its human capital. Many of the
ambitious FTC matters begun in this period collapsed as a consequence. The FTC experience in the 1970s
is examined in Hyman & Kovacic, Consume or Invest, supra note 58, at 305–11.
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When allocating resources, what is the right balance between “consumption” in
the form of initiating new law enforcement matters and “investments” in
administrative infrastructure, procedures, knowledge, and other forms of
capability that put the agency in a position to succeed for the long term?188 There
is a critical mass of enforcement necessary for the agency to build credibility
among business managers, develop the capacity of its staff, and attain legitimacy
in the eyes of elected officials and the larger public.189 Therefore, a new agency
may be forced to operate at a tempo that, to some extent, exceeds its ability to
complete all of its projects successfully. But if the gap between early promises
and actual delivery becomes too great, many projects will collapse in a manner
that demoralizes the agency’s staff and creates a reputation for ineptitude.
The relaunch of Pakistan’s competition system over the past decade
illustrates the hazards of creating a serious mismatch between a program’s
commitments and its capacities. The first generation of the reformed agency’s
leadership undertook an agenda of high-profile challenges in major sectors of the
economy.190 At first, these measures were seen as evidence of the agency’s new
vitality and courage, replacing the timidity of the former system with bold acts.
Within years, it became apparent that the agency lacked the capacity to capably
manage a large number of ambitious projects, particularly in the face of strong
resistance from the affected businesses, which enmeshed the agency in
protracted, indeterminate litigation.191
D. Learning
Learning is one of the most important processes by which agencies adapt to
cope effectively with the mandates they are entrusted to implement. As the
competition authority accumulates experience, it can reasonably seek to conduct
a larger number of inquiries or undertake individual matters of greater difficulty.
Our perception is that the more effective agencies learn in two ways – from their
own experience and from the experience of other competition law regimes—
either directly from individual regimes or indirectly through the work of
international bodies such as the International Competition Network,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development.192 To learn from its own
experience, the agency must devise a process for assessing its completed projects
and its processes, and incorporating what it learns into its future work.193 In order
188. Id. 322–24.
189. See Kovacic, Respected Brand, supra note 51, at 247–48.
190. Khalid Mirza, Presentation, Roundtable on foundations of an effective competition agency (July
19–21, 2011).
191. See FERNANDO FURLAN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, UNCTAD, PEER REVIEW OF THE
COMPETITION SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN, 11–13 (2013) (examining Pakistan’s competition system’s modern
experience).
192. See supra notes 34–37, 65–69 and accompanying text. See also Hollman & Kovacic, supra note
13 (discussing role of multinational networks in collecting and transmitting knowhow).
193. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of evaluation in
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for any single agency to learn from the experience of other bodies, the agencies
with experience must share what they know, the good and the bad, alike.194
E. Political Support
It is extraordinarily difficult to implement a competition policy program in a
jurisdiction that is hostile or indifferent to the aims of the law. It is still more
difficult to build a program amid political entropy. Weak political support or
episodes of severe political instability inevitably lengthen the period for effective
implementation of the competition law. By contrast, strong political support—
which the agency itself may help to build195—allows an agency to overcome many
of the impediments noted above and enables it to focus on making the case for
its work through its performance.
F. Supporting Institutions
The implementation of competition law depends heavily on the quality of
supporting institutions, what Allan Fels refers to as “co-producers.”196 A crucial
such institution for a competition agency is a country’s judicial system. A wellfunctioning judicial system confers a great advantage on the development of the
competition regime. By contrast, a country with feeble or, worse, corrupt courts
faces a lengthy process of retooling its judiciary or establishing new tribunals
dedicated to competition law.197
A competition system also ultimately cannot thrive without the support of
academic institutions that teach courses and perform research in competition law
and industrial organization economics.198 The speed with which a jurisdiction
develops a sound intellectual infrastructure will affect the pace and quality of
implementation.
G. International Cooperation
Engagement with other jurisdictions can help agencies overcome resource
limits, accelerate learning, and build political support.199 This goal can be
improving agency performance).
194. An agency must be willing to suppress the instinct to save face by concealing its failures or by
attributing all good outcomes solely to its skill (rather than, for example, to sheer luck). It may be easier
to do this in a setting—say, a small, closed meeting of senior competition agency officials—in which senior
managers are willing to speak more freely. Since the early part of this decade, Kovacic has participated
in a seminar hosted by the Fordham Law School in which 15–20 senior competition officials discuss
sensitive topics (for example, dealing with political pressure applied by elected officials) that would be
awkward to address in front of a large audience. This format facilitates a more open and informative
discussion and has great potential to accelerate learning across agencies.
195. See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 1, at 18–19.
196. We are grateful to Allan Fels for bringing this concept to our attention.
197. See Kovacic, Institutional Foundations, supra note 1, at 306–07.
198. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
199. See Thomas J. Doleys, Promoting Competition Policy Abroad: European Union Efforts in the
Developing World, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 337 (2012) (discussing the influence of the European Union
and its member states on the development of competition systems in emerging markets).
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accomplished through bilateral programs of technical assistance, agency-toagency cooperation, or through participation in international regional alliances
or larger international networks.200 To an increasing degree, these mechanisms
enable agencies to obtain highly valuable information about the substance and
process of competition law. Further, regular exchanges with their counterparts in
other countries allows agency leaders to learn how to deal with sensitive issues
involving political pressure and relations with other public agencies.
H. Periodic Assessment And Upgrades
The most successful implementation efforts have taken place in jurisdictions
that undertake periodic reviews of the competition system.201 The virtuous cycle
one observes in the best systems consists of a three-stage process of
experimentation, assessment, and refinement.202 Many of these states, including
Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan, have returned to their national
legislatures to obtain major system upgrades.203
VI
CONCLUSION
In his influential study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison lamented
the limits of our understanding of how much institutional arrangements (what he
called “bureaucracy”) contributed to the failure of governments to achieve good
policy results.204 To bridge the gap between expectations and actual performance,
Allison called for a redirection of effort by students of public administration: “If
analysts and operators are to increase their ability to achieve desired policy
outcomes, . . . we shall have to find ways of thinking harder about the problem of
‘implementation,’ that is, the path between preferred solution and actual
performance of the government.”205
The challenge Allison posed forty-five years ago applies powerfully to the
modern expansion of competition law. The design and successful implementation
of law reform are difficult tasks in any legal system. They are inherently even
more difficult in developing and transition economies, dozens of which have
adopted competition laws in the past twenty-five years.
Generally, the path to success for new competition systems has been a process
of incremental improvement. The best experiences have taken place in
jurisdictions that have pursued gradual increases in the tempo and difficulty of
projects undertaken. The need for a deliberate, phased approach is most acute in
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 34–37, 65–69 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text.
204. GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 266
(Little Brown & Co. 1971). On the major impact of Allison’s study on the analysis of bureaucratic
decisionmaking, see Barton J. Bernstein, Book Review, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 1999, at 121.
205. ALLISON, supra note 204, at 267–68.
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countries with unfavorable initial conditions—badly funded agencies, weak
political support, and thin human capital.
Our analysis of implementation programs to date suggests the value of
greater emphasis on institution building as a dimension of competition law
reforms. It also calls for patience in setting expectations about what most regimes
are likely to be able to accomplish.
The future development of competition law in newer systems requires a mix
of realism and ambition. Competition agencies and their external constituencies
must approach the establishment of the new regulatory regime with realistic
expectations about what it takes to build an effective system in light of what
jurisdictions have accomplished to date. Realism is an antidote to the
disappointment and frustration that can set in when good results do not emerge
in the early years of a law’s implementation. To develop a new system of effective
economic regulation is a long-distance event, not a 100-meter sprint.
Realism must be accompanied by ambition to press ahead and achieve the
gradual improvement in institutional quality and operational methods that
supply the foundation for good policy outcomes. Clear-sighted appreciation of
implementation difficulties does not warrant surrender. As a number of new
competition agencies have shown, the sustained commitment to a virtuous cycle
of experimentation, assessment, and improvement can yield steady incremental
improvements that build superior institutions—the foundation for superior
policy performance.

